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Abstract
In this paper, we model network formation and network interactions under a unified frame-
work. The key feature of our model is to allow individuals to respond to incentives stemming
from interaction benefits on certain activities when they choose friends (network links), while
capturing homophily in terms of unobserved characteristic variables in network formation
and activities. There are two advantages of this modeling approach: first, one can evaluate
whether incentives from certain interactions are important factors for friendship formation or
not. Second, in addition to homophily effects in terms of unobserved characteristics, inclu-
sion of incentive effects in the network formulation also corrects possible friendship selection
bias on activity outcomes under network interactions. A theoretical foundation of this unified
model is based on a complete information cooperative game. A tractable Bayesian MCMC
approach is proposed for the estimation of the model. We apply the model to empirically
study American high school students’ friendship networks with the Add Health data. We
consider two activity variables, GPA and smoking frequency, and find a significant incen-
tive effect from GPA, but not from smoking, on friendship formation. These results suggest
that the benefit of interactions in academic learning is an important factor for friendship
formation, while the interaction benefit in smoking is not, even though homophily in smok-
ing behavior is important for a smoker to link to other smokers. On the other hand, from
the perspective of network interactions, both GPA and smoking frequency are subject to
significant positive interaction (peer) effects.
JEL classification: C21, C25, I21, J13
Keywords: Social Networks, social interaction, selectivity, spatial autoregression, Bayesian
estimation
2
1 Introduction
Economic research on social networks and interactions has grown over the past two decades.
For many economic issues, the role of a social network as a channel to disseminate information
or facilitate activities is revealed.1 Accompanying a wide application of network concepts
in economics, both academic researchers and practitioners are interested in understanding
how networks are formed. This question is not only interesting in its own right, but is
also important to understand how network structures may affect economic activities. In the
context of social interactions, regardless of whether research subjects are workers, students,
or delinquents, one likes to know how individuals choose their friends in order to take into
account the advantage of peer effects on economic outcomes. As a friendship network might
be formed in order to achieve favorable economic consequences, when studying the result
of network (or peer) effects on economic activities, there is a need to correct for possible
endogeneity biases due to friendship selection. Besides, the choice of friendships might
amplify observed peer interaction effects due to unobserved factors behind both decisions of
friendship and economic activities (Weinberg, 2007). With regard to the latter, Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens (2013), Hsieh and Lee (2016), and Johnsson and Moon (2016) study
possibly important unobserved driving factors and use them to link network formation and
network interactions on economic activities.
As mentioned, favorable outcomes due to peer interactions might be motivating factors
for network formation from an economic prospective. In this paper, we propose an extended
modeling approach for static networks and interactions among individuals, with a special
interest on whether economic outcomes under interactions play roles in network formation.
A static network refers to a cross-sectional case in which only one observation of a network
1For example, job finding and labor force participation (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo´-
Armengol and Jackson, 2007; Bayer et al., 2008); social learning and knowledge diffusion (Conley and Udry,
2001, 2010); risk sharing and insurance (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007a,b); obesity transmission (Christakis
and Fowler, 2007; Fowler and Christakis, 2008); peer effects on students’ academic achievement (Calvo´-
Armengol et al., 2009); sport and club participation (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014); and juvenile
delinquencies or criminal activities (Ballester et al., 2010; Bayer et al., 2009; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008,
2012)
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is available.2 We assume the possibility that economic outcomes give individuals utility
values so that individuals may have incentives stemming from interaction benefits on certain
activities when making friendship decisions. With an empirical survey data for friendship,
it remains interesting to see from data which economic activities would provide significant
incentives for forming friendships.
The advantage of modeling both network formation and network interactions under a uni-
fied framework is twofold: first, one can evaluate the importance of individuals’ incentives
stemming from economic activity interactions on friendship formation; second, the resulting
model can correct possible friendship selection biases when studying network interactions on
economic activities. We apply this model to study American high school students’ friend-
ship networks with the Add Health data. Two activity variables, student’s GPA and how
frequently a student smokes in a usual week, are of special interest and are considered in
this paper. We find a significant incentive effect from GPA but not from smoking, which
suggests that the interaction benefit in academic learning is a factor for building friendships,
while the interaction benefit in smoking is not. Our results also reveal significant homophily
effects from both observed and unobserved characteristics for network formation. Moreover,
we find a significant homophily effect on smoking activity, which confirms that why smokers
like to make friends with other smokers. Unobserved characteristics in network formation
have significant influences in activity outcomes, i.e., outcomes with peer interactions are
subject to selection biases in unobserved characteristics related to friendship formation. The
outcome incentives and unobserved characteristics provide two sources of selection biases in
activity outcomes. Though we found both GPA and smoking activity are subject to peer
effects, but the estimated endogenous (peer) effects in activity outcomes from our model
become smaller than those of a network interaction model where the network is assumed to
be exogenously given, which indicates that our modeling approach can effectively detect and
correct selection biases in outcome interactions due to endogenous friendship formation.
2We focus on a static setting because widely used social network data are cross-sectional ones without
dynamics, e.g., Add Health data (Udry, 2003) and Indian rural village data (Banerjee et al., 2013). Few
students’ friendship network data which have panel waves can be found in the literature of stochastic actor-
based dynamic network modeling proposed by Snijders (2001) and Snijders et al. (2010).
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To model static networks, one approach is to assume pairwise independence between
network links. For example, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a,b) and Comola (2007) apply
the pairwise independence assumption, which allows them to focus on individual and dyad-
specific variables to explain network formation. A further extension is available in the latent
position model (Hoff et al., 2002; Handcock et al., 2007) and the model with degree het-
erogeneity (Graham, 2014), where individuals are assumed having unobserved positions (or
fixed effects) in the network which reflect heterogeneity of their social or economic statuses.
These unobserved positions allow researchers to control homophily effect in terms of unob-
served individual characteristics. Under pairwise independence, conditional on unobserved
individual effects, the likelihood of the whole network is the product of likelihoods from
all pairwise links.3 However, as noted by Bramoulle´ and Fortin (2009), the assumption of
pairwise independence is strong because it requires that the latent utility for each pairwise
link be separable. This means that an individual’s utility derived from a network is equal
to the sum of utilities from each of her links and each link utility is not affected by any
other links in the network. However, while one is easier to provide economic justification
in terms of game theoretical consideration in network formation, it ignores finding from the
statistical literature that relevant network characteristics can be important in the estimation
of network formation probabilities.
A statistical investigation on static networks, without imposing the pairwise indepen-
dence assumption, is to treat an observed network as a polychotomous choice with 2m(m−1)
alternatives made jointly by individuals, where m is the size of the network. The Exponen-
tial Random Graph (ERG) model proposed by Frank and Strauss (1986), or more generally,
the p∗ model by Wasserman and Pattison (1996), are the models of this type. In either an
ERG or a p∗ model, several selected network statistics, such as the number of reciprocal
links, the number of k-stars, k ≥ 2, are specified in an exponential probability distribution
to capture how likely those network structures are to appear in a network. The parameters
of those network statistics in ERG and p∗ models do not provide casual interpretations.
In terms of estimation, the likelihood function of an ERG model involves an intractable
3The unconditional likelihood will involve integration of the conditional likelihood with respect to the
unobservables’ distribution.
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normalizing term in the denominator which requires evaluation of network statistics on all
possible network realizations. To handle the intractable normalizing term during estima-
tion, researchers need to use the classical M estimation incorporated with simulation (Geyer
and Thompson, 1992; Snijders, 2002) or the Bayesian approach with auxiliary Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) (Liang, 2010; Murray et al., 2006). These estimation methods are
generally more computational intensive compared to pairwise independent network models.
However, these methods are still tractable and manageable.
In this paper, we go beyond the pairwise independence specification and consider the
exponential probability distribution to model network data. However, different from stan-
dard ERGMs, we motivate the model specification from economic reasoning. Meanwhile, we
control unobserved individual heterogeneity through latent variables as we did in Hsieh and
Lee (2016). Our proposed network formation model can handle both unobserved individual
heterogeneity and endogenous economic activities as incentives in link decisions. Few papers
in the literature are relevant to us (Christakis et al., 2010; Steglich et al., 2010; Badev, 2013;
Sheng, 2014; Chandrasekhar and Jackson, 2014; Mele, 2016). In Christakis et al. (2010),
Sheng (2014), Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014), and Mele (2016), they model link forma-
tion but without incorporating network interaction effects on activity outcomes; and they do
not have economic outcomes as incentive factors in link decisions. In Steglich et al. (2010)
and Badev (2013), network links and activity outcomes are modelled jointly. However, the
difference between their approaches and ours is that they define peer effect as the effect of
peers’ activities on individual’s utility, while we define it as the effect of peers’ activities
on individual’s activity following the conventional social interaction literature with both en-
dogenous and contextual interactions. Besides, our approach additionally capture individual
unobserved heterogeneity during network formation while they do not.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a unified modeling approach for
both network formation and network interactions on economic activities. A Bayesian es-
timation method for the proposed model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides an
application of the model to high school students’ friendship networks and activities with the
Add Health data. Section 5 concludes the paper. We leave a simulation study for showing
model identification in the appendix. Some more technical details for estimation are in a
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supplementary file.
2 Models of network formation and network interac-
tions on economic activities
Our research subjects are individuals in a closed group, such as students in a school-grade
or workers in a company. Let Wg be a mg ×mg matrix (spatial weights matrix; adjacency
matrix; sociomatrix) representing a friendship network of mg individuals (size) in group g,
where g = 1, · · · , G, with G being the total number of groups.4 The (i, j)th entry of Wg,
denoted as wij,g, is a dichotomous indicator which equals one if individual i sends a link
to individual j and zero, if not. The notation wi.,g stands for the i
th row of Wg and W−i.,g
stands for Wg excluding wi.,g. The links are all directed without imposing reciprocality.
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Therefore, it is possible that individual i sends a link to j but j does not send a link to i, i.e.,
Wg is not symmetric. Diagonal elements, wii,g, i = 1, · · · ,mg, are zeros, a` priori. Let xi,g
be a k-dimensional row vector containing individual i’s exogenous characteristics and the
mg×k dimensional matrix Xg with xi,g as its ith row be a collection of such vectors in group
g. For economic activities, we consider two types of variables – continuous and Tobit-type
(continuous but left censored at zero).6 Let yi,cg and yi,tg denote, respectively, individual
i’s continuous and Tobit-type activity variables in group g; Ycg = (y1,cg, y2,cg, · · · , ymg ,cg)′
and Ytg = (y1,tg, y2,tg, · · · , ymg ,tg)′ be, respectively, the mg-dimensional column vectors for all
members’ continuous and Tobit-type activity variables in group g.
We assume that individuals make their decisions on friendship links and economic ac-
tivities in two stages with complete information. In the first stage, individuals choose their
friends and in the second stage, they choose economic activities with network interactions.
4We do not rule out the case that there is only a single group, i.e., G = 1.
5We do not impose reciprocality of friendship links in our model because in our empirical data set – Add
Health, friendships are nominated by individuals privately without mutual consent.
6We do not consider the case of binary variables in this paper because it might involve the issue of
multiple equilibria if network interactions are based on observed binary variables (Krauth, 2006; Soetevent
and Kooreman, 2007). The modeling of binary variables is of interest and challenging. We will leave it for
future research.
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This two-stage process is characterized as a two-stage static game with complete information.
Individuals adopt strategies on choosing friends and economic activities and obtain utilities
as payoffs of the game. We further assume this two-stage game is cooperative. Cooperative
behaviors among individuals in a closed group are argued by economists and biologists with
theories from iterated prisoner’s dilemma and cooperative strategies (i.e., tit-for-tat) (See
e.g., Peck, 1993; Hruschka and Henrich, 2006; Majolo et al., 2006; Ule, 2008; Fu et al., 2008;
and Fosco and Mengel, 2011) and social preference (See, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Also,
Jackson (2010) indicates that studying allocation rules behind the cooperative network for-
mation game is rational in many economic applications, such as students’ friendship network
in schools, where favors can be exchanged between students.7
We further assume there is complete information between the two stages. The equilibrium
of this two-stage game satisfies the principle of sequential rationality, i.e., a player’s strategy
should specify optimal actions at every point in the game tree (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Hence, one can solve the equilibrium of this game by backward induction. First, determine
equilibrium activities in the second stage and calculate corresponding optimum utilities of
economic activities for each possible network pattern. Then by incorporating the optimum
utilities from economic activities under network interactions into the utilities of links in the
first stage, solve for the equilibrium network.8
7By assuming the game is cooperative, we can obtain one unique game equilibrium from maximizing the
transferable utility defined by the aggregate of individual utilities and that of a coordinator, which directly
links to formulation of our empirical model in terms of the expoenenial probability distribution. On the other
hand, when assuming the game is non-cooperative, one needs to handle multiplicity of game equilibria in the
empirical study by either specifying a partially identified model (Sheng, 2014) or changing the model from
the static one to an evolutionary one with the equilibria characterized by the potential function (Christakis
et al., 2010; Badev, 2013; Mele, 2016). In both cases, specification of individual utility in the empirical study
will be restricted, owing to the curse of dimensionality and the requirement of symmetry for the potential
function.
8The reason why we assume a complete information between the two stages instead of specifying the
expectation of activity outcomes in the network formation process is because we want the disturbance term
from the activity outcome to have a direct impact on network formation, which forms a mechanism of
selection. If using the expectations of activity outcomes, the disturbances will be irrelevant in the network
formation process, and we lose the channel to correct the selection bias on the estimated peer effect in the
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2.1 Network interactions on activities
Following the equilibrium solving rule of this two-stage game, we first provide the details
of the network interaction process in the second stage. We adapt the utility specification
from Ballester et al. (2006) and Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009) which considers that, given
the network Wg, an individual faces a quadratic utility from choosing activity yi,cg,
ui,cg(yi,cg, Y−i,cg,Wg) = µi,gyi,cg − 1
2
y2i,cg + λcyi,cg
mg∑
j=1
wij,gyj,cg, (1)
for i = 1, · · · ,mg, where µi,g captures individual exogenous heterogeneity. The first and
second terms of Eq. (1) show that the utility is concave in individuals’ activity. The third
term reflects a complementary (or competitive) effect from peers’ activities if λc ≥ 0 (λc ≤ 0).
The sub-game cooperative equilibrium can be found from maximizing the transferable utility,
defined as the aggregate of individual utilities,
U(Ycg,Wg) =
mg∑
i=1
ui,cg(yi,cg, Y−i,cg,Wg) =
mg∑
i=1
µi,gyi,cg − 1
2
mg∑
i=1
y2i,cg + λc
mg∑
i=1
(
yi,cg
mg∑
j=1
wij,gyj,cg
)
.
(2)
From the first order condition,
∂U(Ycg,Wg)
∂yi,cg
= µi,g − yi,cg + λc
mg∑
j=1
(wij,g + wji,g)yj,cg = 0, (3)
we have the corresponding individual activity characterized by
y∗i,cg(Y−i,cg,Wg) = λc
mg∑
j=1
(wij,g + wji,g)yj,cg + µi,g. (4)
For the individual exogenous heterogeneity, we model it as µi,g = xi,gβ1c+
∑mg
j=1 wij,gxj,gβ2c+
αcg + i,cg, where αcg represents an unobserved group effect of group g; and i,cg is a shock
activity outcome equation. Though we can still estimate the incentive effect from the expectation of activity
outcome in the network formation, the formed network would be independent with the disturbances in the
outcome equations. Our model is relatively more complicated in that a formed network may correlate with
disturbances (shocks) of the outcome equation. In some cases, the model can also be interpreted as joint
decisions in a single stage instead of two stages. However, the two-stage decision setting would be more
flexible in general. Descriptions will be subsequently presented.
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for i, assumed known to all players but unknown to econometricians. By the theorem of
Ballester et al. (2006), as long as |λc| is less than the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of
(Wg +W
′
g), the unique interior cooperative equilibrium activity vector will take the form as
9
Y ∗cg(Wg) =
(
Img − λc(Wg +W ′g)
)−1
(Xgβ1c +WgXgβ2c + lgαcg + cg) , (5)
for g = 1, · · · , G, where Img is an mg ×mg identity matrix; lg is the mg-dimensional vector
of ones; and cg = (1,cg, 2,cg, · · · , mg ,cg)′.
The activity vector of Eq. (5) matches the reduced form of the spatial autoregres-
sive (SAR) model (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Lin, 2010) for social interactions
except that in our current case, the observed Wg will be endogenous and its elements corre-
late with the disturbance cg.
10 The coefficient λc in Eq. (5) represents the endogenous (peer)
effect, which is the key parameter of interest to us. The vector of coefficients, βc = (β
′
1c, β
′
2c)
′,
will capture effects from individuals’ own and friends’ exogenous characteristics, i.e., own
and contextual effects, on Ycg. Specifying group effects in Eq. (5) will capture specific group
characteristics in addition to contextual variables and will be helpful to handle the identi-
fication problem caused by correlated effects. Moffitt et al. (2001) argues that correlated
unobservables (to econometricians) in a group may contribute to correlations of Ycg across
elements and cause an identification problem by confounding the endogenous effect. Here,
group effects refer to effects from (unobserved) environmental factors shared by all mem-
bers in the same group.11 Note that with the strategy in Eq. (5), the group can obtain the
9It is interesting to note that in the non-cooperative environment considered in Ballester et al. (2006),
the unique interior Nash equilibrium activity vector will be given by
Y ∗cg(Wg) =
(
Img − λcWg
)−1
(Xgβ1c +WgXgβ2c + lgαcg + cg) .
Compared to Eq. (5), individuals only receive the endogenous peer effect from outward links (friendships
nominated) but not from inward links (friendships received) in a non-cooperative environment. In a cooper-
ative environment, externality is taken into account.
10The original SAR model is specified as
Ycg = λc(Wg +W
′
g)Ycg +Xgβ1c +WgXgβ2c + lgαcg + cg.
11For a single group or a network, the group effect would be absorbed by the intercept term. Group effects
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corresponding aggregated utility U(Y ∗cg(Wg),Wg) =
1
2
Y ∗
′
cg (Wg)Y
∗
cg(Wg) for a given network
structure Wg. In certain cases, activity variables might be continuous, but nonnegative, i.e.,
a Tobit-type variable which is left-censored at the value zero, such as smoking frequency con-
sidered in the empirical study of this paper. A Tobit-type activity outcome would be the case
of activity outcomes subject to non-negative constraints. Since network interactions on such
Tobit-type variables are similarly captured by a SAR model with non-negative constraints,
we delegate details of network interactions on Tobt-type variables to Appendix A.
One concern of using a conventional SAR model in studying network interactions is the
possible endogeneity of the weight matrix, Wg. If Wg is endogenous and it correlates with
the disturbance term g of the model, estimating a conventional SAR model by treating Wg
as exogenous will result in biases on the estimated endogenous effect, as well as other effects.
A standard instrumental variable (IV) approach would suggest finding instruments for the
endogenous weight matrix. However, without utilizing information provided by structures
of Wg or its formation process, an effective instrument might be difficult to find. Instead of
pursuing an IV approach, we propose a structural model in this paper which unifies the SAR
with a network formation model. In the next subsection we will present the first stage of
the game and introduce individual utility functions for network formation. The equilibrium
condition of the network formation game motivates specified network statistics in ERGM
with economic reasoning. The key to combining the network formation and interaction
processes on economic activities, as mentioned before, is to allow individuals to consider
potential benefits, which they can earn from interacted economic activities, when choosing
friends.
are of interest only when there are many groups.
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2.2 Network formation with incentives from interaction benefits
We consider that each individual i, i = 1, · · · ,mg, obtains her utility from network links in
Wg as:
vi,g(Wg) =
mg∑
j=1
wij,gψij,g︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous Effects
+ $i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
Network Structure Effects
+
d¯∑
d=1
δd
2
y∗2i,dg(Wg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effects
. (6)
In Eq. (6), the exogenous effects capture influences from individual-specific and dyad-specific
exogenous characteristics on the link utility. The function, ψij,g, has the specification,
ψij,g = ci,gγ1 + cj,gγ2 + cij,gγ3 +
¯`∑
`=1
γ4`|zi`,g − zj`,g|. (7)
The variables, ci,g and cj,g, in Eq. (7) are s¯-dimensional row vectors of individual-specific char-
acteristics and the variable, cij,g, is a q¯-dimensional row vector of dyad-specific characteristics,
such as the same age, sex, or race shared by each pair of individuals (i, j) in group g. The indi-
vidual and dyadic characteristics Cg = {(ci,g, cj,g, cij,g) : i = 1, · · · ,mg, j = 1, · · · ,mg, i 6= j}
provide the controls of homophily from observed (for econometricians) characteristics in
friendship formation process (see e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a,b) on the study of
risk-sharing network formation). To further capture unobserved (for econometricians) indi-
vidual heterogeneity during the network formation process, we follow Hsieh and Lee (2016)
to introduce multi-dimensional individual latent variables zi,g = (zi1,g, · · · , zi¯`,g)′ and use
|zi`,g − zj`,g|, ` = 1, · · · , ¯` in Eq. (7) to capture the homophily of unobserved characteristics.
We expect the coefficients γ′4`s to be negative to reflect the fact that the larger the differences
between individual unobserved characteristics, the less likely that two individuals become
friends. We assume that the individual latent variable zi,g are components in i,cg (as well as
i,tg) in the activity outcome. To be explicit, we assume cg = Zgρ1c +WgZgρ2c + ξcg, where
Zg = (z1,g, · · · , zmg ,g)′. Correspondingly, the activity outcome of Eq. (5) should be modified
into
Y ∗cg(Wg) =
(
Img − λc(Wg +W ′g)
)−1
(Xgβ1c +WgXgβ2c + Zgρ1c +WgZgρ2c + lgαcg + ξcg) ,
(8)
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where we assume ξcg ∼ Nmg(0, σ2ξcgImg) for estimation. In Eq (8), Zg and WgZg are regarded
as controls of individual and contextual unobserved correlated effects. Fruehwirth (2014)
argues that any omitted contextual effect will be picked up by the endogenous peer effect.
This issue is similar to Manski (1993)’s reflection problem in social interactions.
Furthermore, it is possible to allow |y∗i,dg(Wg)− y∗j,dg(Wg)| to appear in ψij,g for capturing
the homophily effect from activity outcomes. Such an extension provides a channel for
activity variables to feedback network formation. For example, individuals may take into
account the difference of smoking intensities in forming friendships – heavy smokers may like
to make friends with other heavy smokers and a non-smoker may not like to make friends
with heavy smokers.
The network structure effects in Eq. (6) capture influences from some patterns of link
dependence on the link utility, where $i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g) represents a h¯-dimensional row vector
of summary statistics constructed from Wg which are relevant to individual i’s utility and η is
a corresponding vector of coefficients. By considering network structure effects, our network
model differs substantially from the pairwise network link case (Bramoulle´ and Fortin, 2009)
and connects to ERG models in the statistical literature. The empirical specification of
network structure effects used in this paper will be discussed later in Section 4.1.
The incentive effects in Eq. (6) are innovative in this paper, which represent benefits from
network interactions, i.e., utilities obtained from the activity outcomes with interaction. For
example, students may want to make friends with someone who is doing well in school in order
to learn from him or her to improve their own education performance. As there is assumed
complete information across two stages, individuals can exactly foresee these benefits during
the network formation process. The incentive effects are functions of optimized individual’s
activity responses, which are intuitive. The coefficients δd’s capture how important are
benefits of economic outcomes as factors in network formation decision. Moreover, the
aggregate of individual incentive effects equals to the aggregated utility generated from
economic activities under network interactions, which is similar to a dynamic inter-temporal
utility optimization setting with δd’s as discounting factors of the second stage utility.
There may be several (d¯) economic activities which provide incentives for forming friend-
ships. For simplicity, these incentive effects are assumed to be separable as utility compo-
13
nents. As noted by Ballester et al. (2006), utilities from economic outcomes with network
interactions always increase with the number of links in the network if interactions provide
complementary effects on economic activities. Since the utility from network links contains
incentive effects, individuals might choose to add as many links as possible if there were
no cost on link formation. This is also related to the problem of network degeneracy as
discussed in Snijders et al. (2006). To mitigate such a strong incentive to form links, we rely
on nontrivial negative effects from some exogenous or network structural effects to represent
possible costs of forming friendship links.12
Similar to network interactions in the second stage of the game, we define a transferable
utility of this cooperative network formation game from the aggregate of individual utilities,
which is
T(Wg) = V(Wg) + τWg =
mg∑
i=1
vi,g(Wg) + τWg
=
mg∑
i=1
mg∑
j=1
wij,gψij,g +
mg∑
i=1
$i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η +
d¯∑
d=1
δd
2
Y ∗dg(Wg)
′Y ∗dg(Wg) + τWg , (9)
where Y ∗dg(Wg) represents a d
th vector of activity outcomes, such as Y ∗cg(Wg) discussed in
Eq. (8) or Y ∗tg(Wg) discussed in Appendix A. τWg stands for other value that the coordinator
considers in addition to the aggregated utilities of individuals, which is uncorrelated with the
network or the activity outcome. Thus, Wg is the formed network if and only if T(Wg) reaches
the maximum value over all possible network patterns, i.e., T(Wg) = maxW˜g∈Ωg(V (W˜g) +
τW˜g), where Ωg is the set of possible network patterns for the individuals in a group g. By
assuming that τW˜g is from an i.i.d. type I extreme value random variable indexed by W˜g in
Ωg, we have the exponential probability specification for Wg:
P (Wg) =
exp(V(Wg))∑
W˜g∈Ωg exp(V(W˜g))
, (10)
which relates our network formation model to the ERG framework. A typical ERG model (Frank
and Strauss, 1986; Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Snijders, 2002) assumes a probability
12Bhamidi et al. (2011), Chatterjee et al. (2013), and Mele (2016) also argue that the most basic ERGs are
statistically equivalent to an Erdo¨s-Re´ny random graph in the limit of large size unless the model contains
at least one non-trivial negative network structural effect.
14
function of Wg as:
P (Wg) =
exp(Q(Wg))∑
W˜g∈Ωg exp(Q(W˜g))
,
where a specification of the function, Q(Wg), can accommodate various network statistics
of interest. But in order to apply this type of a model in empirical studies, researchers
tend to specify link dependencies sparingly so that the resulting probability is simple and
practical (Jackson, 2010). Network statistics such as the number of k-stars, k ≥ 2, and
the number of triangles are used in Q(Wg) to measure how likely those network structures
appear in observed networks. However, the coefficients of those network statistics do not
represent causal relationships. In contrast to typical ERG models, our specification of V(Wg)
in Eq. (10) is related to an economically motivated utility function for network formation.
In fact, this model can also be modeled as a one shot game with a joint decision for Wg and
Ydg’s by maximizing the aggregate utility
T(Wg, Y1g, · · · , Yd¯,g) =
mg∑
i=1
mg∑
j=1
wij,gψij,g +
mg∑
i=1
$i,g(wi.,g,W−i,g)η +
d¯∑
d=1
δdU(Ydg,Wg) + τWg
(11)
for the case that all δd’s are strictly positive. This follows because
max
Wg ,Y1g ,··· ,Yd¯,g
T(Wg, Y1g, · · · , Yd¯,g)
= max
Wg
{
mg∑
i=1
mg∑
j=1
wij,gψij,g +
mg∑
i=1
$i,g(wi.,g,W−i,g)η +
d¯∑
d=1
δd max
Ydg
U(Ydg,Wg) + τWg
}
= max
Wg
T (Wg). (12)
However, jointly modeling the endogenous network formation and activity variables under a
unified framework as a two stage game has a flexibility. In the event that individuals do not
respond to incentives from economic activities when choosing their friends, the coefficients
δd’s can be zero. In that case, a one shot game can provide only the solution for network
formation, but not for economic activities. Optimum economic activities can be determined
only if a second stage game is formulated.
Even though the i.i.d. assumption on τW˜g gives the conditional logit form in Eq. (10),
which is relatively simple for estimation, it inevitably exhibits the property of independence
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of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). One may change the distribution of τW˜g to the generalized
extreme value (GEV) distribution
F (τWg(1) , τWg(2) , · · · , τWg(J)) = exp[−Γ(e−τWg(1) , e−τWg(2) , · · · , e−τWg(J) )]
so that it permits correlations among the total of J network alternatives, where J is the
number of networks in Ωg. If the j
th network alternative Wg(j) is chosen with the highest
value of T(W ), we obtain the GEV model
P (Wg(j)) =
exp(V(Wg(j))Γj[e
V(Wg(1)), eV(Wg(2)), · · · , eV(Wg(k))]
Γ[eV(Wg(1)), eV(Wg(2)), · · · , eV(Wg(k))] ,
where Γj denotes ∂Γ/∂ exp(V(Wg(j))). Within the GEV model family, the function Γ can be
specified to relax the IIA property in the resulting probability function, for example, nested
logit is a widely used one if the data exhibits a nested structure. However, it is not obvious
in our empirical context that friendship network alternatives may exhibit a nested structure.
Therefore, we maintain the i.i.d. assumption on τWg for our empirical applications in this
paper.
The model specification alleviates the problem of friendship selection bias on the economic
activities under interaction in two ways. First, the correlation of Wg and ξdg is explicitly
modeled. Secondly, the disturbance terms ξdg’s appear in both the network formation and
network interaction process. Hence, they capture unobserved factors which contribute to
both friendship and economic activity decisions. In the following section, we will discuss
how to estimate this model.
3 Model estimation
3.1 Likelihood function of the model
To give a clear but succinct illustration on how the likelihood function of our model is
constructed, we consider a model with an incentive effect from a continuous activity variable
as an example. For readers who are interested in the Tobit activity case or models with
multiple activity variables,13 we provide additional discussion on their likelihood functions
13In Section 2.2 we consider the optimization of activities is separable (in utility). Therefore, when we
consider a single activity outcome in the model, but in fact there are other omitted activity outcomes, then
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in Appendix B.
With an incentive effect from the continuous variable Ycg, the joint probability of the
activity variable Ycg and the network Wg is
14
P (Wg, Ycg|θcg, αcg, Zg) = P (Ycg|Wg, θcg, αcg, Zg) · P (Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg)
= |Scg(Wg)| · f(ξcg|Wg, θcg, αcg, Zg) · P (Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg)
= |Scg(Wg)| · f(ξcg,Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg)
= |Scg(Wg)| · f(ξcg|θcg, αcg, Zg) · P (Wg|ξcg, θcg, αcg, Zg)
= |Scg(Wg)| · f(ξcg|θcg, αcg, Zg) · exp(V(Wg, ξcg, θcg, αcg, Zg))∑
W˜g∈Ωg exp
(
V(W˜g, ξcg, θcg, αcg, Zg)
) ,
(13)
where Scg(Wg) = Img − λc(Wg +W ′g), and
f(ξcg|θcg, αcg) = (2pi)−
mg
2
(
σ2ξcg
)−mg
2
exp
(
− 1
2σ2ξcg
ξ′cgξcg
)
,
with ξcg = Scg(Wg)Ycg − Xgβ1c − WgXgβ2c − Zgρ1c − WgZgρ2c − lgαcg and the parameter
vector θcg = (γ
′, η′, δc, λc, β′c, ρ
′
c, σ
2
ξcg
).
The main issue we will encounter during estimation is to calculate the likelihood func-
tion of the exponential distribution for the network. When the network size is moderate,
its calculation is almost impossible since it requires evaluating all network patterns in Ωg
for the denominator of the exponential distribution function. For example, even in a net-
work with just 5 individuals, it needs to evaluate 24×5 = 220 terms of possible network
the resulted optimal utility components from other omitted activity outcomes, given W , become a part in τW
– disturbance in network utility, which is independent of the included optimum activity outcome. However,
if disturbances of activity outcomes are correlated, then we need to include both to avoid correlation of the
optimum utility components from activity outcomes.
14In Eq. (13), we use the observed Ycg to evaluate the function V(Wg, ξcg, θcg, αcg, Zg) in the numerator.
To evaluate V(W˜g, ξcg, θcg, αcg, Zg) in the denominator for any W˜g, we follow the reduced form outcome
equation in Eq (8) to get
Y ∗cg(W˜g) =
(
Img − λc(W˜g + W˜ ′g)
)−1 (
Xgβ1c + W˜gXgβ2c + Zgρ1c + W˜gZgρ2c + lgαcg + ξcg
)
.
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alternatives (patterns) for the denominator. Hence, any estimation method involves direct
likelihood evaluation would be infeasible. This problem applies to all ERGMs for networks
and can be traced back to the spatial analysis in Besag (1974).
To deal with this problem, several estimation methods have been proposed. The first
is the maximum pseudo-likelihood approach (MPL). This approach was first mentioned
in Besag (1974) and later applied to the network study in Strauss and Ikeda (1990). A
pseudo-likelihood simply uses the product of conditional probabilities for estimation. The
estimates from the MPL would not be the MLE. One may use the estimates from the MPL
as initial values for other estimation approaches. Another approach is the Monte Carlo
maximum likelihood (MCML) estimation approach which simulates auxiliary networks for
approximating the denominator of the exponential distribution function with its simulated
counterpart (Geyer and Thompson, 1992). One shortcoming of the MCML approach is that
the choice of initial values during the optimization algorithm plays a critical role. They have
to be close enough to the true parameter values, otherwise, the convergence of the algorithm
might not be attained (Bartz et al., 2009; Caimo and Friel, 2011). The Robbins-Monro
approach used in Snijders (2002) to simulate auxiliary networks for constructing simulated
moments usually accepts a wide range of initial values which may lead to a convergent
algorithm. In this paper we turn to the Bayesian estimation with an effective MCMC tech-
nique (discussed in Section 3.3) developed to handle an intractable normalizing term in the
posterior density function.
Regarding identification of parameters in our models, one may focus on the coefficients of
incentive effects, δd’s, in the network formation model, and the endogenous effects, λd’s, in the
network interaction models. The remaining parameters in the network formation model will
be identified as long as corresponding regressors are not linearly dependent (Mele, 2016).
So are the coefficients of regressors in the network interaction models (Bramoulle´ et al.,
2009). In Bayesian theory, a parameter is identifiable if data can update the conditional
posterior distribution of the parameter to distinguish it from the prior distribution (Dre`ze,
1974; Poirier, 1998) and the posterior distribution becomes more concentrated at a single
peak when data are more informative (Koop et al., 2013). To show that the incentive and
endogenous effects in our model are identified, we conduct a simulation experiment which
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shows that the conditional posterior distributions of these parameters collapse to the true
values when the sample size increases. The details of this simulation experiment are left in
Appendix D.
3.2 Posterior distributions and the MCMC
The posterior distribution of parameters considered here is based on the model with one
continuous activity variables.15 To facilitate the Bayesian posterior analysis, it is natural to
include the sampling of unobservables (including group fixed effects and latent variables) dur-
ing the MCMC procedure as an augmentation (Albert and Chib, 1993). We use the notation
{Ag} to represent the collection of variable Ag across G groups, i.e., {Ag} := (A1, · · · , AG).
By Bayes’ theorem, the joint posterior distribution of the parameters and unobservables in
the model with exogenous variables, {Xg} and {Cg} suppressed for simplicity is
P ({θcg}, {αcg}, {Zg}|{Ycg}, {Wg}) ∝ pi({θcg}, {αcg}, {Zg}) ·
G∏
g=1
P (Ycg,Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg) ,
(14)
where pi(·) represents the density function of a prior distribution. We assume independence
across prior distributions of common parameters, group effects, and latent variables, namely,
pi({θcg}, {αcg}, {Zg}) = pi1({θcg})pi2({αcg})pi3({Zg}). It is not easy to directly simulate draws
from the joint posterior density in Eq. (14). But one can use the Gibbs sampling algorithm
and work on the conditional posterior densities of parameters.
By properly blocking parameters in {θcg} into subgroups, we define prior distributions
for parameters and other unknown variables in the model as follows:
(i) Latent variables in both network formation and economic activity equations,
zi,g ∼ N¯`(0, I¯`), i = 1, · · · ,mg, g = 1, · · · , G.
(ii) Coefficients of network formation utility,
φ = (γ′, η′, δc) ∼ N2s¯+q¯+¯`+h¯+1(φ0,Φ0I2s¯+q¯+¯`+h¯+1), φ ∈ O = {φ ∈ R2s¯+q¯+¯`+h¯+1|δc ≥ 0}.
15We provide the posterior analysis in correspondence to the model with one continuous and one Tobit-type
activity variables in Appendix C.
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(iii) Coefficient of endogenous effect in the economic activity equation,
λc ∼ U [−1/τG, 1/τG].
(iv) Coefficients of own and contextual effects in the economic activity equation,
βc ∼ N2k(β0, B0I2k).
(v) Coefficients of own and contextual correlated effects in the economic activity equation,
ρc ∼ N2¯`(ρ0, R0I2¯`).
(vi) Variance of disturbances in the economic activity equation,
σ2ξcg ∼ IG (κ02 , ν02 ), g = 1, · · · , G.
(vii) Group fixed effects in the economic activity equation,
αcg ∼ N (α0, A0), g = 1, · · · , G.
In the above prior distributions, except the one for λc, they are conjugate priors com-
monly used in the Bayesian literature. We assign γ, η, and δc into the group, φ, since they
are all (linear) coefficients in the function, V(Wg), for network formation. We require the
incentive effect, δc, to be non-negative. This constraint helps us to rule out the case of neg-
ative incentive effects, which is not reasonable for the utility specification. Thus, the prior
distribution of φ is a truncated multivariate normal on the convex cone, O, with φ0 and Φ0
being, respectively, a prior mean vector and a variance before truncation. For λc, we employ
a uniform prior as suggested in Smith and LeSage (2004) on the area A = [−1/τG, 1/τG],
with τG = max{τ ∗1 , · · · , τ ∗G} and τ ∗g = {max1≤i≤mg
∑mg
j=1 |wij,g + wji,g|}. As pointed out by
Kelejian and Prucha (2010), Img − λc(Wg + W ′g) is nonsingular for all values of λc in this
interval. The prior of σ2ξcg is specified as an inverse Gamma distribution with the shape and
scale parameters governed by κ0
2
and ν0
2
. In the specification of (vii), we treat the group
effects αcg as fixed effects with the hyperparameters, α0 and A0, fixed in their prior distri-
butions. The distinction between fixed and random effects in a Bayesian approach lies on
prior assignment at the second and the third levels of hierarchy (Lancaster, 2004; Rendon,
2013). For a fixed effect model, a Bayesian approach updates distributions of fixed effect
parameters, while for a random effect model it updates distributions of hyperparameters in
the prior distribution of random effect parameters. If it were preferred to explicitly model
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the correlation between covariates and group effects, one may follow Mundlak (1978) to
have a random effect specification which allows the mean of random effect (i.e., the mean
hyperparameter in the prior distribution of the random effect) to be a linear function of
covariates.16 To show if there is any impact due to the specification of random group effects,
we also examine the estimation results of our model based on the correlated random effect
specification for a robustness check.
Within each Gibbs sampling step, random draws can be simulated from the conditional
posterior distribution for a parameter group. We provide the list of conditional posterior
distributions used by the Gibbs sampler in the supplementary appendix. Since any of the
conditional posterior distributions is not available in a closed form, we use the Metropolis-
Hastings (M-H) algorithm to draw from those conditional distributions. Tierney (1994) and
Chib and Greenberg (1996) have shown that the combination of Markov chains (Metropolis-
within-Gibbs) is still a Markov chain with the invariant distribution being the correct objec-
tive distribution. The procedure of the MCMC sampling starts with arbitrary initial values
for {α(0)cg }, {Z(0)g }, and {θ(0)cg }, and then the sampling proceeds sequentially from the above
set of conditional posterior distributions. A further detail about implementing the MCMC
sampling based on steps (i) to (vii) is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
In the following section, we will discuss a relative new version of the M-H algorithm which
can be used when the likelihood function contains an intractable normalizing term.
3.3 Double M-H algorithm
From Section 3.1, the likelihood function of y = ({Ycg}, {Wg}), given the vector of param-
eters and unknown variables θ, which refers to the vector ({θcg}, {αcg}, {Zg}), is P (y|θ) =
16We specify αcg as follows:
αcg = Xgβ3c + Zgρ3c + ζcg, ζcg ∼ N (0, σ2α,c),
where Xg and Zg are, respectively, the group averages of Xg and Zg. The β3c, ρ3c, and σ
2
α,c are unknown pa-
rameters, and we also specify prior distributions for them such that β3c ∼ Nk(β0, B0Ik), ρ3c ∼ N¯`(ρ0, R0I¯`),
and σ2α,c ∼ IG (κ02 , ν02 ). As a result, we form a hierarchical prior for αcg where the prior mean and the prior
variance of αcg follow other prior distributions.
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∏G
g=1 P (Ycg,Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg), where P (Ycg,Wg|θcg, αcg, Zg) is from Eq (13). It takes the form
P (y|θ) = f(y; θ)/D(θ), where D(θ) is an intractable normalizing term. The standard M-H
algorithm to simulate random draws of θ runs as follows: given an old draw, θold, one pro-
poses a new one, θnew, from a proposal distribution, q(·|θold), and then updates the old draw
to the new draw with an acceptance probability, α(θnew|θold). Denoting pi(θ) as the prior
distribution of θ, the acceptance probability needs to be computed as
α(θnew, θold) = min
{
1,
P (θnew|y)q(θold|θnew)
P (θold|y)q(θnew|θold)
}
= min
{
1,
pi(θnew)f(y; θnew)q(θold|θnew)
pi(θold)f(y; θold)q(θnew|θold) ·
D(θold)
D(θnew)
}
. (15)
One can see that in Eq. (15), the normalizing terms, D(θold) and D(θnew), are left in both
the numerator and denominator and will not cancel out, so the evaluation of the acceptance-
rejection criterion based on α in Eq. (15) would be intractable. Murray et al. (2006) consider
to include auxiliary variables, y˜ = ({Y˜cg}, {W˜g}), into the acceptance probability, i.e., the
acceptance probability can be written as
α(θnew, θold, y˜) = min
{
1,
pi(θnew)P (y|θnew)q(θold|θnew)
pi(θold)P (y|θold)q(θnew|θold) ·
P (y˜|θold)
P (y˜|θnew)
}
= min
{
1,
pi(θnew)f(y; θnew)q(θold|θnew)
pi(θold)f(y; θold)q(θnew|θold) ·
f(y˜; θold)
f(y˜; θnew)
}
, (16)
where y˜ are simulated from the likelihood function, P (y˜|θnew) = f(y˜; θnew)/D(θnew) with
the exact sampling (Propp and Wilson, 1996). In the conditional acceptance probability of
Eq (16), all normalizing terms cancel out and the other terms left are computable. This
algorithm is called the “exchange algorithm” because a swapping operation between (θold, y)
and (θnew, y˜) is involved (Geyer, 1991). The exchange algorithm is different from the con-
ventional M-H algorithm by adding a randomization component into the proposal density,
which changes q(θnew|θold) into q(θnew|θold)P (y˜|θnew). The exchange algorithm defines a valid
Markov chain for simulating from P (θ|y) (Murray et al., 2006; Liang, 2010; Liang et al., 2016).
However, to implement the exchange algorithm is time consuming because it requires the
exact sampling of y˜ from P (y˜|θnew). In order to save time on the computation, Liang (2010)
proposes a “double M-H algorithm” which utilizes the reversibility condition and shows that
when y˜ is simulated by the M-H algorithm starting from y with m iterations, the conditional
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acceptance probability in Eq. (16) can be obtained regardless of the value of m. This gives
the double M-H algorithm an advantage, as a small value of m can be used, removing the
need for the exact sampling. Due to this computational efficiency compared to the exact
sampling for our model, we adopt the double M-H algorithm in this study.
One thing worth mentioning is that in this paper we provide a technical modification
on the double M-H algorithm which can simplify the simulation and better fit into our
application. Using the double M-H algorithm to update θ from P (θ|y) requires simulating
auxiliary variable, y˜. However, the auxiliary activity variables, {Y˜cg} in y˜ are redundant as
they can be fully replaced by a function of auxiliary networks, w˜ = {W˜g}. Therefore, we
modify the conditional acceptance probability in Eq. (16) to
α(θnew, θold, w˜) = min
{
1,
pi(θnew)P (y|θnew)q(θold|θnew)
pi(θold)P (y|θold)q(θnew|θold) ·
P (w˜|θold)
P (w˜|θnew)
}
= min
{
1,
pi(θnew)f(y; θnew)q(θold|θnew)
pi(θold)f(y; θold)q(θnew|θold) ·
f(w˜; θold)
f(w˜; θnew)
}
. (17)
To evaluate α(θnew, θold, w˜) in Eq. (17), we only simulate the auxiliary networks, w˜, from
the probability density function, P (w˜|θnew) = f(w˜; θnew)/D(θnew), which shares the same
normalizing term, D(θnew), with P (y˜|θnew). We leave the details of simulating w˜ in the
supplementary appendix.
4 Friendship network, academic and smoking behav-
iors
We apply our model to study American high school students’ friendship networks in the Add
Health data, which is a national survey based on grades 7 through 12 in 132 schools (Udry,
2003).17 Four waves of surveys were conducted between 1994 and 2008. In the wave I in-
school survey, a total of 90,182 students were interviewed. Respondents answered questions
17This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and
designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies
and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in
the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health
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about their demographic backgrounds, academic performances, and health-related behaviors.
Most uniquely, students were asked to nominate up to five male and five female friends.
This provides information about their friendship networks. In the following waves of in-
home surveys, more information about students’ families and neighborhoods in which they
live are available for a subset of the total sample. To accommodate most of the students’
nominated friends into our framework, the sample used in this study is constructed from
the wave I in-school survey. We consider two activities which may be relevant for friendship
formation. One is a student’s academic performance (measured by GPA, which is regarded
as a proxy for studying activity), which is represented by a continuous variable. The other is
how frequently a student smokes in a week, which is represented by a Tobit-type variable.18
In the context of social interactions, students’ academic performance and smoking be-
havior are extensively studied as they have important long-term consequences on students’
future lives and health. Studies of peer effects on students’ academic performance, including
Hoxby (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Hanushek et al. (2003), and Zimmerman (2003), use the
linear-in-means model; and Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009), Lin (2010), Boucher et al. (2014),
and Liu et al. (2014) use the network interactions model. For studies of peer effects on stu-
dents’ smoking behaviors, evidence of peer effects can be found from Gaviria and Raphael
(2001), Powell et al. (2005), Lundborg (2006), Clark and Lohe´ac (2007), Fletcher (2010),
and Hsieh and Van Kippersluis (2016). When studying interaction (peer) effects, researchers
face difficulty in identifying correlated effects from group-level unobservables and endoge-
nous selection into groups (Moffitt et al., 2001), and separating the endogenous interaction
effect from contextual effects in a linear model (the reflection problem by Manski (1993)).
With various approaches (e.g., randomization, fixed effects, etc.) to avoid these difficulties,
researchers generally provide evidences for the existence of peer effects. Hsieh and Lee (2016)
further consider the problem of endogenous friendship selection on peer effects on economic
website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for
this analysis.
18Discussions about how academic performance and smoking affect friendship selections, see, e.g., Kiuru
et al. (2010), Lomi et al. (2011), Flashman (2012), Schaefer et al. (2013). Other activities may affect
friendship choices. We focus on academic performance and smoking because they are the key subjects of
interest discussed in social interaction studies.
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activities by modeling unobservables in both the network interaction and network formation
process. They find that the endogenous effect on academic performance obtained from the
SAR model without controlling the endogeneity of the spatial weight matrix can be upward
biased. In the present study, we control individual unobservables in formation of friendship
networks as in Hsieh and Lee (2016). Moreover, we find that the benefit of interactions from
academic learning is an important factor for students to form friendships.
4.1 Structural network effects in the link-associated utility
For our empirical study, we consider the following specification of the structural network
effects in the link-associated utility of Eq. (6),
$i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η
= η1
mg∑
j=1
wij,gwji,g︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reciprocality Effect
+ η2
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
mg∑
k 6=j
wik,g
+ η3 mg∑
j=1
wij,g
mg∑
k 6=j
wik,g
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sender′s Expansiveness Effect
+ η4
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
mg∑
k 6=i
wkj,g

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Receiver′s Popularity Effect
+ η51
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
(mg∑
k
wik,gwkj,g
)
+ η52
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
(mg∑
k
wki,gwkj,g
)
+ η53
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
(mg∑
k
wik,gwjk,g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transitive Triads Effect
+ η6
mg∑
j=1
wij,g
(mg∑
k
wjk,gwki,g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Three Cycles Effect
. (18)
In Eq. (18), the reciprocality effect reflects the utility from reciprocal friendships. The
sender’s expansiveness effect in Eq. (18) reflects the utility from being an outgoing person
who actively nominates friends. The statistics involved in the sender’s expansiveness effect
are the sender’s outdegree and the outdegree square. We expect the coefficient, η3, would be
negative to reflect the reality that individuals might not make too many friends due to limited
resources, e.g., limited time, energy, and money. The receiver’s indegree is used to measure
the receiver’s popularity effect in Eq. (18), which reflects the utility from making friends
with someone who is popular. The transitive triads effect and the three cycles effect both
reflect the utility from engaging in a transitive relationship, i.e., friends of my friends are my
friends. However, they are distinguished by directions of links. From Kova´rˇ´ık and van der
Leij (2014), transitive triads effects may be linked to an individual’s sense of risk aversion.
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The three-cycles effect can be interpreted as an opposite hierarchy effect (Snijders et al.,
2010). If the coefficient η6 is negative, it implies a local hierarchy among linked individuals.
The effects that we specify in Eq. (18) are motivated by which network structural statistics
represent the potential benefits and costs of network connections. They can be categorized
into the first, second, and third order interaction terms of network links. More discussion on
the categorization is provided in the supplementary appendix.
Given $i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η in Eq. (18), the term
∑mg
i=1$i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η in the transferable
utility of Eq.(9) can be written as
mg∑
i=1
$i,g(wi.,g,W−i.,g)η = η1tr(W 2g ) + η2(l
′
gW
′
gWglg − l′gWglg)
+ η3(l
′
gW
′
gDiag(Wglg)Wglg − 2l′gW ′gWglg + l′gWglg)
+ η4(l
′
gWgW
′
glg − l′gWglg) + (η51 + η52 + η53)tr(W 2gW ′g) + η6tr(W 3g ),
(19)
where lg is a column vector of ones, and Diag(A) is a n×n diagonal matrix with its diagonal
elements formed by the entries of a n× 1 vector of A. One can see that parameters η51, η52
and η53 are not separately identified from Eq. (19). Hence, without loss of generality, we will
use η5 for η51 + η52 + η53 hereafter.
4.2 Data summary
To ease the computation burden, we only work with small networks in this study. The
following steps are used to construct the sample. First, we group students by their school
and grade level and consider friendships only inside the same group. In the Add Health
data, about 80% of friendship nominations happen within the same grade level. Hence,
about 20% of links are missed due to the design of network boundary. So effectively, we
are investigating friendship formation within a school grade, and such a friendship network’s
effects on student activities. Second, we focus on senior high school students from 9th to
12th grades. Third, we restrict our network sample to those groups with sizes between 10
and 50 (10 and 60 for the smoking case). A total of 1,290 (1,510 for the smoking case)
respondents from 47 networks (44 networks for the smoking case) are utilized for analysis.
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There are 113 (9.6%) missing observations for GPA and 34 (2%) missing observations for
smoking.19 These networks have the average size equals to 25.043 (33.546 for the smoking
case), average density equals to 0.142 (0.108 for the smoking case), average outdegree equals
to 2.564 (2.866 for the smoking case), and average clustering coefficient equal to 0.327 (0.332
for the smoking case). In the network formation model, we capture an individual-specific
effect by a dummy variable of whether a student is older than the group average or not.
Three other dummy variables – whether a pair of students has the same age, same sex, or
same race – are used to capture dyad-specific effects.
For the activity under network interaction model, the continuous variable, GPA, is cal-
culated by the average of a respondent’s reported grades from several subjects, including
language, social science, mathematics, and science, of which each has a value between 1
and 4. The Tobit-type variable, smoking, is obtained from student’s response to the survey
question, “During the past twelve months, how often did you smoke cigarettes?”, which has
a value between 0 and 7. We follow Lin (2010), Lee et al. (2010), and Hsieh and Lee (2016)
to choose the independent variables. A complete list of variables is provided in Table 1. In
Figures 1 and 2, we plot two typical networks from our sample – one is from the GPA sample
and the other is from the smoking sample. From these two figures, one can observe that
students who have higher GPAs tend to receive more friendship nominations than those who
have lower GPAs. This observation does not seem to be evident for smoking behaviors, but
one can see that smokers are friends with each other. Our estimation results shown in the
following section provide evidence for the incentive stemming from interaction benefits on
academic learning, but not from the pleasure of smoking together, on friendship decisions.
Smokers are making friends with other smokers through homophily on smoking.
To obtain estimates from the Bayesian estimation in this empirical study, the values of
hyperparameters in the prior distributions are set as follows:20 φ0 = 0; Φ0 = 10; β0 = 0;
B0 = 10; ρ0 = 0; R0 = 10; σ0 = 0; Σ0 = 10; α0 = 0; A0 = 400. These specified values of
hyperparameters are chosen to form very flat prior densities over the ranges of parameter
19Individuals with missing economic activities are eventually kept in sample for estimation as Bayesian
methods can easily handle missing observations on dependent variables via simulation.
20See Appendix C for the prior distribution assumptions for a full model with continuous and Tobit-type
activities.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
GPA Smoking
drop missing keep missing drop missing
variable min max mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
GPA 1 4 2.910 0.734 - - - -
Smoking 0(57.86%) 7 - - - - 1.257 2.511
Age 10 19 16.004 1.285 15.960 1.294 15.997 1.269
Male 0 1 0.493 0.500 0.490 0.500 0.482 0.499
Female 0 1 0.507 0.500 0.510 0.500 0.517 0.499
White 0 1 0.611 0.487 0.522 0.500 0.629 0.483
Black 0 1 0.246 0.430 0.326 0.469 0.230 0.421
Asian 0 1 0.016 0.125 0.013 0.114 0.016 0.123
Hispanic 0 1 0.068 0.251 0.076 0.265 0.067 0.250
Other race 0 1 0.059 0.236 0.063 0.243 0.058 0.233
Both parents 0 1 0.725 0.447 0.697 0.460 0.733 0.442
Less HS 0 1 0.114 0.318 0.110 0.313 0.109 0.312
HS 0 1 0.340 0.473 0.353 0.478 0.341 0.474
More HS 0 1 0.398 0.490 0.374 0.484 0.402 0.490
Edu missing 0 1 0.068 0.252 0.073 0.260 0.067 0.250
Professional 0 1 0.248 0.432 0.238 0.426 0.249 0.432
Staying home 0 1 0.220 0.414 0.227 0.419 0.228 0.419
Other Jobs 0 1 0.366 0.481 0.339 0.473 0.356 0.479
Job missing 0 1 0.076 0.265 0.093 0.291 0.077 0.266
Welfare 0 1 0.011 0.103 0.120 0.111 0.010 0.100
Num. of students at home 0 6 0.580 0.818 0.584 0.837 0.568 0.793
Network size 25.043 13.146 27.447 13.790 33.546 16.551
Network density 0.142 0.100 0.137 0.102 0.108 0.076
Outdegree 2.564 2.294 2.652 2.353 2.866 2.406
Indegree 2.564 2.418 2.652 2.487 2.866 2.596
Clustering Coef. 0.327 0.120 0.344 0.105 0.332 0.086
Sample size 1,177 1,290 1,476
Num. of networks 47 47 44
Note: ‘Both parents’ means living with both parents. ‘Less HS’ means mother’s education is less than high
school. ‘Edu missing’ means mother’s education level is missing. ‘Professional’ means mother’s job is either
scientist, teacher, executive, director and the like. ‘Other jobs’ means mother’s occupation is not among
Professional or Staying home. ‘Welfare’ means mother participates in social welfare programs. ‘Num. of
students at home’ means number of other students from grade 7 to 12 living in the same household with
the student. The variables in italics are omitted categories during estimation. We drop missing observations
in the ‘drop missing’ case. There are only 2% of missing observations on smoking and therefore we do not
consider the ‘keep missing’ case in the smoking sample.
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Figure 1: A friendship network from the GPA sample
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Note: The number (and color) for each node indicates the value of GPA. Nodes with a larger
size means they have higher indegrees.
Figure 2: A friendship network from the Smoking sample
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Note: The number (and color) for each node indicates the frequency of smoking. Nodes with
a larger size means they have higher indegrees.
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spaces so that estimation results are less influenced by our choice of priors. The reported
estimation results are based on the MCMC sampling draws which pass the convergence test
provided by Geweke (1992).
4.3 Estimation results
4.3.1 Case of GPA
We first estimate the model with a single incentive effect from the academic activity measured
by GPA, which is a continuous variable. The sample contains 9.6% of observations that have
missing values on GPA and thus we apply the Bayesian data imputation approach to recover
them in estimation. An intuition of this data imputation approach is in Appendix E. We
report the results in Table 2. From columns 1 to 4, we separately consider the full model,
the model without latent characteristic variables, the model without the incentive effect in
network formation, and the activity outcome equation under network interaction assuming
exogenous network links. We compare the full model with possibly misspecified models
in order to see how each model misspecification may affect estimates of the full model,
particularly for the estimate of endogenous interaction effect on outcomes (λc). In the table,
the mean and the standard deviation (in parenthesis) of MCMC posterior draws are reported
as point estimates for each parameter.
The result of network formation in the full model shows that whether being older than
the group average or not does not have a significant effect on sending or receiving friendship
nominations. The exogenous dyad-specific effects are all positive and significant, where the
effect of the same race (0.4904) is strongest, followed by the effects of the same sex (0.4308)
and the same age (0.1081). The distances of three latent characteristic variables have signif-
icant negative effects (-0.4546, -0.3459, and -0.1913) on network formation, confirming the
existence of homphily with respect to unobservables (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013;
Hoff et al., 2002; Hsieh and Lee, 2016).21
21We follow Hsieh and Lee (2016) to specify the dimension of latent variables to be three. We have also
tried the fourth dimension and found there is no further change on the estimates of endogenous peer effect
and other coefficients. Therefore, the results suggest that three dimensions of latent variables suffice to
correct the endogeneity bias. Also notice that we are unable to evaluate the exact likelihood values of the
30
Among structural network effects, the positive and strong reciprocality effect (1.1632) is
consistent with findings in the literature (Badev, 2013; Snijders et al., 2010; Mele, 2016),
which reflects that mutual friendship nominations among students are pervasive (49.8% of
friendship links) in our sample. The sender’s expansiveness effect is concave, as the coef-
ficient of the first order term is positive (0.2314) and the coefficient of the second order
term is negative (-0.0270). This result confirms our conjecture that limited resources, e.g.,
time, energy, and money, might constrain students from making too many friends. The
receiver’s popularity effect is negative (-0.0274), which suggests that students between 9th
and 12th grades in our sample are less willing to make friends with someone who is popular.
The positive and strong transitive triads effect (0.5735) shows that students value transitive
relationships. When the positive triads effect is accompanied by the negative three cycles
effect (-0.2285), as discussed in Snijders et al. (2010), a certain degree of local hierarchy
among students is revealed. The incentive effect from GPA is found to be large and signif-
icant (0.7010). Therefore, for high school students in our sample, the potential benefit of
learning from others in school work is a factor which influences their friendship decisions.
Our important finding on academic performance under network interactions is that, by
controlling network endogeneity through both the latent characteristic variables and the
incentive effect, the estimated endogenous effect on academic performance drops from 0.0138
in the network interaction model alone (column 4) to 0.0077 in the full model (column 1).
This result demonstrates the effectiveness of our joint modeling approach for network and
activity outcome on correcting the selection bias inherited in the activity outcome equation.
Results of two restricted models in columns 2 and 3 further show that the bias correction
comes from both the incentive effect and the unobserved latent characteristic variables. 35%
of the bias is due to omitting the incentive effect and 10% of bias is due to omitting the
latent variables. Our estimate implies that the social multiplier effects, measured by the
vectors (Img − λc(Wg +W ′g))−1lmg across individuals in a group and across groups, have the
average equals to 1.0121 and the standard deviation equals to 0.005.
From the estimates of own effects of individual characteristics, we observe that students
who are older and male tend to have lower GPAs. On the contrary, students who are
model and therefore we cannot perform the same AICM model selection criterion as in Hsieh and Lee (2016).
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Hispanic, Asian, or whose mothers have education more than high school tend to have
higher GPAs. We also see two latent characteristic variables (2nd and 3rd dimensions) show
significant positive effects on GPA. Estimates of all contextual effects, observed or not, are
found insignificant in the full model.
4.3.2 Case of smoking
Next, we consider the model with smoking activity. The results are reported in Table 3.
As there are only 2% of missing observations on the variable of smoking, the corresponding
individual observations are dropped.22 From the part of network formation in the full model,
we find that students who are older than the group average tend to receive fewer friendship
nominations (-0.0858). The estimates of exogenous dyad-specific effects show significant ho-
mophily in terms of sex and race, but not age, for friendship formation. In order to capture
the possible feature that smokers tend to make friends of each other, we add the absolute
difference of smoking frequencies between individuals as an additional control of homophily
effect in network formation. Since smoking frequency is an activity outcome under interac-
tions, the difference of smoking frequencies in network formation is an endogenous factor,
which represents the feedback of activity outcome in network formation as a homophily effect
instead of an incentive effect. The results confirm that there is a significant homophily effect
in terms of smoking activity (-0.0399). The effects of homophily on other three unobserved
characteristics (-0.1557, -0.1331, and -0.1152) are also significant here, even those estimates
are lower in absolute value than those in the GPA case. Structural network effects are gen-
erally similar to those in the GPA case. An important finding is that the incentive effect
from smoking is small and insignificant (0.0041). Hence, we conclude that students in our
sample do not consider the interaction benefit from smoking as a factor for their friendship
decisions but the homophily effect in smoking behavior matters.
For the equation of smoking activity under network interactions, the estimated endoge-
nous (peer) effect drops from 0.0620 in the network interaction model alone (column 4) to
0.0534 in the full model (column 1). This change again shows that our modeling approach
can correct the selection bias. We also see that the correction is more due to the latent
22We do not expect data imputation would have an effect on estimates.
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variable (column 3) instead of the incentive effect (column 2). This result echoes our finding
from the network formation model that the incentive effect of smoking is small and insignifi-
cant; therefore, it does not cause a selection bias on the estimate of endogenous effect in the
smoking activity equation. Our estimate implies that the social multipliers have the average
and standard deviation equal to 1.0943 and 0.0388, respectively.
The estimated own effects of characteristics show that students who are Black, Asian,
or who live with both parents tend to smoke less than their counterparts. On the contrary,
students who are older, male, and whose mothers participated in welfare programs tend to
smoke more than others. From contextual effects, a student may smoke more if he or she is
surrounded by more friends who are Black, or whose mothers have higher education levels.
A student may smoke less by owning more male friends.
4.3.3 Case with both GPA and smoking
Lastly, we estimate the model with incentive effects from both GPA and smoking.23 From
the results reported in Table 4, the parameter estimates in the network formation model are
close to those in Tables 2 and 3. Particularly, the joint modeling of both incentive effects
from GPA and smoking does not affect the estimate of each single effect, which supports the
separability of these incentive effects.
For the outcome equation of GPA, the estimated endogenous interaction effect changes
from 0.0159 in the equation under network interaction by ignoring network endogeneity
(column 4) to 0.0121 in the full model (column 1), which again shows a significant correction
on the friendship selection bias. When further comparing columns 2 and 3, we can see the
correction comes from both the incentive effect and the latent characteristic variables. For
the outcome equation of smoking, there is also a correction on the estimated endogenous
interaction effect from 0.0579 in the equation assuming an exogenous network (column 4) to
0.0475 in the full model (column 1). This correction relies more on the inclusion of latent
variables instead of the inclusion of the incentive effect (as seen from a larger drop from
0.0579 in column 4 to 0.0490 in column 3, compared to a smaller drop to 0.0513 in column
23The sample used to estimate this model is based on the original GPA sample where we remove missing
observations on both GPA and smoking.
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2.) Finally, it is interesting to note that the jointing modeling of two activity outcomes
allows us to estimate the covariance of disturbances in the outcome equations between GPA
and smoking, which is found to be around -0.74 with some variations across groups.
For a robustness check, we additionally estimate the model with correlated random group
effects as discussed in Footnote 16 of Section 3.2. The full estimation results are available in
Table A1 of the Appendix for interested readers to check. We find the coefficient estimates in
the network formation model and the endogenous effects in the activity outcome equations
remain similar to those in Table 4. There are few significant changes on estimated own
effects. Taking the full model for example, the own effect of Asian on GPA drops from
0.2132 in Table 4 to 0.0669 in Table A1. Other significant changes include the own effect
of welfare on GPA, and the own effect of Hispanic on smoking. There is no significant
change on estimated contextual effects between two group effect specifications. Therefore,
our estimation results seem quite robust between fixed and random group effect settings.
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Table 2: Estimation result based on GPA
Full Without Latent Without Incentive Activity Alone
Network Formation
Higher sender age (γ1) -0.0075 (0.0440) -0.0256 (0.0480) -0.0284 (0.0323) -
Higher receiver age (γ2) 0.0295 (0.0239) -0.0197 (0.0464) -0.0357 (0.0384) -
Constant (γ31) -3.5055 (0.0693) -4.4825 (0.0953) -3.3828 (0.0942) -
Same age (γ32) 0.1081 (0.0580) 0.0922 (0.0416) 0.1657 (0.0234) -
Same sex (γ33) 0.4308 (0.0380) 0.3846 (0.0400) 0.4278 (0.0272) -
Same race (γ34) 0.4904 (0.0300) 0.4475 (0.0509) 0.5200 (0.0357) -
Latent dist. (γ41) -0.4546 (0.0277) - -0.5246 (0.0675) -
Latent dist. (γ42) -0.3459 (0.0194) - -0.2936 (0.0334) -
Latent dist. (γ43) -0.1913 (0.0590) - -0.1475 (0.0329) -
Reciprocality (η1) 1.1632 (0.0468) 1.2943 (0.0394) 1.1733 (0.0402) -
Expansiveness (η2) 0.2314 (0.0268) 0.2486 (0.0229) 0.1968 (0.0156) -
Expansiveness (η3) -0.0270 (0.0025) -0.0289 (0.0024) -0.0241 (0.0017) -
Popularity (η4) -0.0274 (0.0059) -0.0296 (0.0054) -0.0323 (0.0052) -
Trans. triads (η5) 0.5735 (0.0167) 0.5873 (0.0192) 0.6011 (0.0133) -
Three cycles (η6) -0.2285 (0.0159) -0.2594 (0.0169) -0.2447 (0.0138) -
Economic incentive (δc) 0.7010 (0.1119) 1.0027 (0.2120) - -
Activity Outcome
Endogenous (λc) 0.0077 (0.0024) 0.0089 (0.0015) 0.0124 (0.0026) 0.0138 (0.0028)
Own (X)
Age -0.1644 (0.0161) -0.2172 (0.0145) -0.2242 (0.0147) -0.2398 (0.0314)
Male -0.1131 (0.0375) -0.1096 (0.0327) -0.0949 (0.0380) -0.1057 (0.0402)
Black -0.0041 (0.0847) -0.0252 (0.0574) 0.0282 (0.0656) -0.0012 (0.0767)
Asian 0.1708 (0.1800) 0.2088 (0.1571) 0.1478 (0.1811) 0.1363 (0.1862)
Hispanic 0.2395 (0.1057) 0.2320 (0.0701) 0.2593 (0.0917) 0.2021 (0.1084)
Other race -0.0501 (0.0938) -0.1254 (0.0592) -0.0252 (0.0960) -0.0580 (0.0928)
Both Parents 0.0761 (0.0467) 0.0590 (0.0326) 0.0697 (0.0455) 0.0643 (0.0450)
Less HS -0.0878 (0.0713) -0.0792 (0.0470) -0.0721 (0.0650) -0.0930 (0.0678)
More HS 0.1362 (0.0479) 0.1711 (0.0412) 0.1153 (0.0461) 0.1559 (0.0469)
Edu missing -0.1082 (0.0845) -0.0680 (0.0542) -0.0705 (0.0788) -0.0476 (0.0815)
Welfare 0.1180 (0.1954) -0.0635 (0.0959) 0.1115 (0.1963) 0.0857 (0.1939)
Job missing -0.0858 (0.0769) -0.0635 (0.0562) -0.0885 (0.0811) -0.0843 (0.0731)
Professional -0.0383 (0.0609) -0.0444 (0.0477) -0.0433 (0.0571) -0.0641 (0.0581)
Other Jobs -0.0006 (0.0530) -0.0089 (0.0498) -0.0130 (0.0498) -0.0233 (0.0491)
Num. of students at home -0.0050 (0.0249) -0.0009 (0.0226) -0.0050 (0.0277) 0.0051 (0.0242)
latent (ρc11) -0.0430 (0.1144) - 0.0981 (0.0707) -
latent (ρc12) 0.4662 (0.0876) - 0.5007 (0.0640) -
latent (ρc13) 0.2117 (0.0695) - 0.1620 (0.0486) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0002 (0.0014) -0.0007 (0.0009) -0.0028 (0.0024) -0.0020 (0.0023)
Male -0.0002 (0.0155) -0.0195 (0.0093) 0.0110 (0.0260) -0.0185 (0.0260)
Black -0.0078 (0.0135) -0.0439 (0.0105) -0.0273 (0.0192) -0.0303 (0.0210)
Asian 0.0038 (0.0869) -0.0072 (0.0477) 0.0077 (0.1563) 0.1459 (0.1611)
Hispanic -0.0019 (0.0385) 0.0075 (0.0192) 0.0215 (0.0634) 0.0062 (0.0582)
Continued on Next Page
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Table – Continued
Other race -0.0301 (0.0362) 0.0076 (0.0247) -0.0708 (0.0479) -0.0842 (0.0547)
Both Parents 0.0074 (0.0180) 0.0466 (0.0122) 0.0405 (0.0268) 0.0438 (0.0296)
Less HS -0.0133 (0.0298) -0.0259 (0.0187) -0.0546 (0.0467) -0.0688 (0.0452)
More HS -0.0013 (0.0170) -0.0053 (0.0109) -0.0116 (0.0274) -0.0034 (0.0283)
Edu missing 0.0037 (0.0343) -0.0156 (0.0223) 0.0484 (0.0535) 0.0313 (0.0562)
Welfare -0.0110 (0.0992) -0.0125 (0.0418) -0.0600 (0.1532) -0.1113 (0.1649)
Job missing -0.0015 (0.0324) -0.0320 (0.0198) 0.0054 (0.0459) -0.0062 (0.0526)
Professional 0.0010 (0.0211) -0.0054 (0.0130) -0.0001 (0.0369) 0.0020 (0.0365)
Other Jobs 0.0004 (0.0185) -0.0155 (0.0121) 0.0022 (0.0315) -0.0031 (0.0320)
Num. of students at home -0.0034 (0.0091) -0.0097 (0.0067) -0.0174 (0.0137) -0.0069 (0.0155)
latent (ρc21) 0.0051 (0.0588) - 0.0330 (0.0313) -
latent (ρc22) -0.0275 (0.0481) - -0.0735 (0.0202) -
latent (ρc23) 0.0009 (0.0258) - 0.0288 (0.0326) -
Group Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
σ
2(∗)
c 0.4588 (0.1166) 0.4361 (0.1776) 0.4432 (0.1121) 0.4561 (0.1931)
Note: The full model contains the activity outcome equation with interactions and the network formation model,
where the network formation model involves the latent characteristic variables and the incentive effect. In the
second column, we remove the latent variables from the network formation model. In the third column, we
remove the incentive effect from the network formation model. In the fourth column, we only estimate the activity
outcome equation. The MCMC runs for 150,000 iterations and the first 50,000 runs are dropped for the burn-in.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations of draws from MCMC. σ
2(∗)
c denote the average of σ
2
c estimated
from different groups and the value in the parenthesis is the average of standard deviations.
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Table 3: Estimation result based on Smoking
Full Without Latent Without Incentive Activity Alone
Network Formation
Higher sender age (γ1) -0.0794 (0.0457) -0.0621 (0.0467) -0.0748 (0.0434) -
Higher receiver age (γ2) -0.0858 (0.0328) -0.0616 (0.0457) -0.0879 (0.0243) -
Constant (γ31) -3.9726 (0.0341) -4.2461 (0.0652) -3.9671 (0.0295) -
Same age (γ32) 0.0356 (0.0379) 0.0463 (0.0417) 0.0425 (0.0328) -
Same sex (γ33) 0.3701 (0.0400) 0.3698 (0.0373) 0.3718 (0.0383) -
Same race (γ34) 0.3307 (0.0357) 0.3378 (0.0462) 0.3402 (0.0284) -
Diff. in smoking (γ35) -0.0399 (0.0061) -0.0358 (0.0077) -0.0396 (0.0050) -
Latent dist. (γ41) -0.1557 (0.0156) - -0.1567 (0.0142) -
Latent dist. (γ42) -0.1331 (0.0126) - -0.1325 (0.0119) -
Latent dist. (γ43) -0.1152 (0.0092) - -0.1156 (0.0087) -
Reciprocality (η1) 1.3354 (0.0433) 1.3568 (0.0404) 1.3021 (0.0363) -
Expansiveness (η2) 0.1932 (0.0167) 0.2186 (0.0211) 0.2053 (0.0187) -
Expansiveness (η3) -0.0228 (0.0017) -0.0251 (0.0021) -0.0240 (0.0018) -
Popularity (η4) -0.0290 (0.0054) -0.0312 (0.0053) -0.0324 (0.0045) -
Trans. triads (η5) 0.6123 (0.0189) 0.6230 (0.0187) 0.6218 (0.0154) -
Three cycles (η6) -0.2613 (0.0161) -0.2709 (0.0157) -0.2625 (0.0138) -
Economic incentive (δt) 0.0041 (0.0027) 0.0046 (0.0027) - -
Activity Outcome
Endogenous (λt) 0.0534 (0.0071) 0.0598 (0.0067) 0.0535 (0.0072) 0.0620 (0.0085)
Own (X)
Age 0.2260 (0.0848) 0.3853 (0.0710) 0.2288 (0.0923) 0.4294 (0.0350)
Male 0.3336 (0.1039) 0.2767 (0.0981) 0.3561 (0.1001) 0.2503 (0.0882)
Black -1.2733 (0.1673) -1.3346 (0.2242) -1.3025 (0.1459) -1.8383 (0.1820)
Asian -1.4314 (0.2410) -1.5606 (0.1515) -1.4860 (0.1966) -1.2254 (0.1837)
Hispanic 0.0439 (0.2158) -0.1062 (0.1873) 0.0370 (0.2167) 0.0786 (0.1517)
Other race 0.1670 (0.2073) 0.0675 (0.1449) 0.1993 (0.1835) 0.4337 (0.1193)
Both Parents -0.2843 (0.1331) -0.2532 (0.1306) -0.3119 (0.1276) -0.2185 (0.1091)
Less HS -0.1726 (0.1791) -0.0531 (0.1827) -0.1941 (0.1685) -0.2750 (0.1267)
More HS 0.0798 (0.1117) 0.1983 (0.1251) 0.0898 (0.1071) -0.0526 (0.0789)
Edu missing -0.4051 (0.1124) -0.0166 (0.2444) -0.3698 (0.1015) -0.4219 (0.1408)
Welfare 0.9096 (0.3287) 1.5383 (0.1878) 0.8364 (0.2907) 1.6941 (0.1116)
Job missing 0.0758 (0.1509) 0.3408 (0.1635) 0.0237 (0.1191) 0.2625 (0.1248)
Professional 0.0618 (0.1177) 0.0746 (0.1180) 0.0657 (0.1080) 0.0934 (0.1711)
Other Jobs -0.0107 (0.1019) 0.0237 (0.1581) -0.0086 (0.0935) 0.0260 (0.1781)
Num. of students at home 0.0704 (0.0722) 0.0206 (0.0736) 0.0670 (0.0667) 0.0335 (0.0645)
latent (ρt11) -0.0198 (0.0456) - -0.0211 (0.0416) -
latent (ρt12) -0.0033 (0.0440) - -0.0008 (0.0434) -
latent (ρt13) -0.0115 (0.0435) - -0.0167 (0.0438) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0063 (0.0054) -0.0166 (0.0051) -0.0059 (0.0049) -0.0155 (0.0062)
Male -0.2012 (0.0591) -0.0673 (0.0614) -0.2092 (0.0604) -0.1655 (0.0655)
Black 0.0983 (0.0473) 0.0967 (0.0557) 0.1058 (0.0412) 0.2349 (0.0460)
Asian -0.1615 (0.2596) -0.7789 (0.3334) -0.2050 (0.2474) -1.0356 (0.2677)
Continued on Next Page
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Table – Continued
Hispanic 0.1733 (0.1097) 0.1831 (0.1481) 0.1926 (0.1060) 0.1688 (0.1225)
Other race 0.0438 (0.1163) -0.1074 (0.1291) 0.0685 (0.1021) 0.1648 (0.1002)
Both Parents -0.0645 (0.0758) 0.0060 (0.0773) -0.0714 (0.0658) 0.1145 (0.0788)
Less HS -0.0236 (0.1151) 0.0759 (0.1195) -0.0330 (0.0984) 0.0646 (0.0954)
More HS 0.1285 (0.0590) 0.2365 (0.0669) 0.1213 (0.0579) 0.2133 (0.0640)
Edu missing 0.2649 (0.1283) 0.4247 (0.1154) 0.2646 (0.1312) 0.4125 (0.1342)
Welfare -0.1205 (0.2371) 0.4216 (0.2771) -0.1087 (0.2261) 0.2538 (0.0802)
Job missing 0.0106 (0.1189) 0.0011 (0.1412) 0.0075 (0.1156) -0.1563 (0.0948)
Professional -0.0733 (0.0770) -0.1230 (0.0940) -0.0657 (0.0771) -0.2740 (0.0645)
Other Jobs -0.1072 (0.0776) -0.0633 (0.0817) -0.0912 (0.0830) -0.1556 (0.0554)
Num. of students at home 0.0098 (0.0445) -0.0098 (0.0407) 0.0073 (0.0400) -0.0243 (0.0440)
latent (ρt21) 0.0018 (0.0260) - -0.0014 (0.0230) -
latent (ρt22) 0.0014 (0.0241) - 0.0027 (0.0248) -
latent (ρt23) 0.0028 (0.0245) - -0.0038 (0.0242) -
Group Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
σ
2(∗)
t 7.1316 (3.6623) 7.1349 (3.5563) 7.1211 (3.6533) 7.0322 (3.5196)
Note: The full model contains the activity outcome equation with interactions and the network formation model,
where the network formation model involves the latent characteristic variables and the incentive effect. In the
second column, we remove the latent variables from the network formation model. In the third column, we
remove the incentive effect from the network formation model. In the fourth column, we only estimate the activity
outcome equation. The MCMC runs for 150,000 iterations and the first 50,000 runs are dropped for the burn-in.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations of draws from MCMC. σ
2(∗)
t denote the average of σ
2
t
estimated
from different groups and the value in the parenthesis is the average of standard deviations.
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Table 4: Estimation result based on both GPA and Smoking
Full Without Latent Without Incentive Activity Alone
Network Formation
Higher sender age (γ1) -0.0583 (0.0440) -0.0143 (0.0512) -0.0512 (0.0282) -
Higher receiver age (γ2) 0.0142 (0.0314) 0.0807 (0.0625) 0.0054 (0.0385) -
Constant (γ31) -3.2972 (0.0729) -4.5936 (0.1105) -3.2913 (0.0274) -
Same age (γ32) 0.1564 (0.0508) 0.1350 (0.0470) 0.1874 (0.0464) -
Same sex (γ33) 0.3563 (0.0444) 0.3598 (0.0458) 0.3836 (0.0358) -
Same race (γ34) 0.6587 (0.0362) 0.6391 (0.0608) 0.6470 (0.0361) -
Diff. in smoking (γ35) -0.0452 (0.0108) -0.0351 (0.0088) -0.0406 (0.0078) -
Latent dist. (γ41) -0.3865 (0.0551) - -0.4448 (0.0387) -
Latent dist. (γ42) -0.3279 (0.0561) - -0.3690 (0.0381) -
Latent dist. (γ43) -0.3110 (0.0420) - -0.2800 (0.0588) -
Reciprocality (η1) 1.2032 (0.0426) 1.3505 (0.0442) 1.2361 (0.0454) -
Expansiveness (η2) 0.2051 (0.0217) 0.2430 (0.0244) 0.2021 (0.0118) -
Expansiveness (η3) -0.0237 (0.0023) -0.0272 (0.0026) -0.0241 (0.0015) -
Popularity (η4) -0.0458 (0.0082) -0.0405 (0.0068) -0.0387 (0.0056) -
Trans. triads (η5) 0.5682 (0.0203) 0.5743 (0.0227) 0.5833 (0.0207) -
Three cycles (η6) -0.2201 (0.0170) -0.2414 (0.0210) -0.2269 (0.0185) -
Incentive from GPA (δc) 0.0028 (0.0024) 0.0023 (0.0013) - -
Incentive from Smoking (δt) 0.7508 (0.0917) 1.0174 (0.2411) - -
Activity Outcome
Endogenous (λc) 0.0102 (0.0028) 0.0100 (0.0023) 0.0138 (0.0032) 0.0159 (0.0035)
Endogenous (λt) 0.0475 (0.0096) 0.0513 (0.0076) 0.0490 (0.0117) 0.0579 (0.0114)
GPA
Own (X)
Age -0.1734 (0.0246) -0.1711 (0.0290) -0.1733 (0.0320) -0.1659 (0.0107)
Male -0.0964 (0.0429) -0.0627 (0.0403) -0.0765 (0.0299) -0.0840 (0.0406)
Black 0.0727 (0.0383) 0.0338 (0.0670) 0.0298 (0.0590) 0.0420 (0.0614)
Asian 0.2132 (0.0951) 0.1732 (0.0726) 0.1407 (0.0631) 0.1533 (0.1153)
Hispanic 0.0883 (0.0638) 0.2272 (0.0831) 0.1520 (0.0676) 0.1388 (0.0996)
Other race -0.0356 (0.0737) -0.0592 (0.0722) -0.0751 (0.0615) -0.0407 (0.0952)
Both Parents 0.0446 (0.0415) 0.0625 (0.0413) 0.0302 (0.0378) 0.0345 (0.0486)
Less HS -0.0660 (0.0638) -0.0405 (0.0536) -0.0922 (0.0600) -0.1080 (0.0629)
More HS 0.0952 (0.0492) 0.1135 (0.0379) 0.1297 (0.0510) 0.1472 (0.0511)
Edu missing 0.0097 (0.0658) -0.0844 (0.0544) -0.0871 (0.0488) -0.0802 (0.0755)
Welfare 0.0467 (0.1078) -0.0149 (0.0735) -0.0867 (0.0804) -0.0245 (0.1188)
Job missing -0.1914 (0.0609) -0.1726 (0.0614) -0.0843 (0.0534) -0.0771 (0.0836)
Professional 0.0455 (0.0566) 0.0499 (0.0638) 0.0568 (0.0523) 0.0363 (0.0534)
Other Jobs -0.0374 (0.0407) 0.0025 (0.0512) -0.0127 (0.0467) -0.0158 (0.0465)
Num. of students at home -0.0133 (0.0273) -0.0040 (0.0317) -0.0070 (0.0285) -0.0020 (0.0299)
latent (ρc11) 0.0170 (0.0436) - -0.0366 (0.0832) -
latent (ρc12) 0.0425 (0.0593) - -0.0337 (0.0779) -
latent (ρc13) 0.0031 (0.0456) - -0.0066 (0.0636) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0026 (0.0015) -0.0013 (0.0014) -0.0022 (0.0026) -0.0036 (0.0026)
Male -0.0347 (0.0162) -0.0275 (0.0115) -0.0065 (0.0265) -0.0030 (0.0267)
Black -0.0454 (0.0157) -0.0352 (0.0120) -0.0456 (0.0212) -0.0376 (0.0198)
Asian 0.1219 (0.0540) 0.1145 (0.0952) 0.1514 (0.0878) 0.1636 (0.1153)
Continued on Next Page
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Table – Continued
Hispanic 0.0280 (0.0255) 0.0348 (0.0276) -0.0034 (0.0531) -0.0012 (0.0605)
Other race -0.0016 (0.0379) 0.0482 (0.0303) -0.1117 (0.0606) -0.0772 (0.0612)
Both Parents 0.0494 (0.0183) 0.0433 (0.0161) 0.0157 (0.0314) 0.0361 (0.0302)
Less HS -0.0568 (0.0233) -0.0438 (0.0199) -0.0525 (0.0371) -0.0487 (0.0455)
More HS -0.0286 (0.0162) -0.0232 (0.0126) 0.0159 (0.0351) 0.0234 (0.0337)
Edu missing -0.0412 (0.0350) -0.0427 (0.0271) 0.0269 (0.0608) 0.0320 (0.0578)
Welfare -0.0991 (0.0401) 0.0424 (0.0548) -0.1378 (0.1004) -0.1075 (0.0830)
Job missing -0.0340 (0.0291) -0.0296 (0.0243) 0.0080 (0.0468) -0.0024 (0.0464)
Professional 0.0173 (0.0258) 0.0148 (0.0160) 0.0276 (0.0398) 0.0207 (0.0418)
Other Jobs 0.0014 (0.0201) 0.0040 (0.0140) 0.0080 (0.0335) 0.0084 (0.0392)
Num. of students at home 0.0059 (0.0091) -0.0002 (0.0076) -0.0026 (0.0185) -0.0023 (0.0184)
latent (ρc21) -0.0229 (0.0328) - -0.0064 (0.0348) -
latent (ρc22) -0.0506 (0.0218) - 0.0011 (0.0250) -
latent (ρc23) 0.0307 (0.0305) - 0.0020 (0.0301) -
Smoking
Own (X)
Age 0.3641 (0.0401) 0.2377 (0.0857) 0.2143 (0.0580) 0.4047 (0.0561)
Male 0.1492 (0.1389) 0.1511 (0.1461) 0.1593 (0.1274) 0.0623 (0.1372)
Black -1.7063 (0.1770) -1.5487 (0.2821) -2.0691 (0.2043) -1.5954 (0.1716)
Asian -1.4598 (0.3010) -1.2536 (0.3758) -1.5287 (0.2840) -1.2423 (0.2593)
Hispanic -0.8702 (0.2902) -0.6784 (0.3572) -0.6409 (0.1603) -0.7279 (0.2111)
Other race 0.4511 (0.2432) 0.3531 (0.3237) 0.4825 (0.2015) 0.3955 (0.1511)
Both Parents 0.1191 (0.1342) 0.0309 (0.1696) -0.0737 (0.1395) 0.0747 (0.1370)
Less HS -0.1258 (0.2256) 0.0149 (0.2324) -0.1363 (0.1611) 0.0950 (0.1831)
More HS -0.1159 (0.1604) -0.0690 (0.1806) -0.2007 (0.1445) -0.1125 (0.1664)
Edu missing 0.2666 (0.2154) 0.0443 (0.3024) 0.0983 (0.2287) 0.3707 (0.1904)
Welfare 0.9348 (0.3718) 0.8101 (0.3787) 1.2524 (0.2273) 1.3218 (0.2652)
Job missing 0.1638 (0.1971) 0.2669 (0.2278) 0.1838 (0.2106) 0.3462 (0.1885)
Professional 0.0008 (0.2035) 0.1032 (0.1975) 0.0449 (0.1513) 0.1776 (0.1714)
Other Jobs -0.0284 (0.1639) 0.0650 (0.1891) -0.0167 (0.1376) 0.1605 (0.1290)
Num. of students at home -0.1177 (0.0876) -0.1319 (0.0951) -0.1540 (0.0983) -0.1632 (0.0798)
latent (ρt11) -0.0751 (0.1712) - -0.0826 (0.1761) -
latent (ρt12) 0.0429 (0.1257) - 0.1133 (0.1756) -
latent (ρt13) -0.0199 (0.1618) - -0.0986 (0.1551) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0234 (0.0088) -0.0286 (0.0098) -0.0295 (0.0099) -0.0210 (0.0082)
Male -0.0402 (0.0913) 0.0085 (0.1029) 0.0244 (0.0988) -0.0143 (0.0821)
Black 0.1883 (0.0750) 0.1794 (0.0854) 0.2148 (0.0896) 0.1802 (0.0651)
Asian -1.5693 (0.3854) -1.4557 (0.3216) -1.9430 (0.3103) -1.5934 (0.3664)
Hispanic 0.1194 (0.1877) 0.1529 (0.2165) 0.1652 (0.1665) 0.1390 (0.1419)
Other race -0.0665 (0.2261) 0.0153 (0.2515) 0.0630 (0.2010) -0.0567 (0.1865)
Both Parents -0.0925 (0.1137) -0.0276 (0.1317) -0.0778 (0.1252) -0.0788 (0.0945)
Less HS 0.0404 (0.1596) 0.0367 (0.1772) -0.0330 (0.1476) -0.1256 (0.1428)
More HS 0.1414 (0.1261) 0.0997 (0.1163) 0.0159 (0.1241) 0.0699 (0.1039)
Edu missing 0.2520 (0.2223) 0.2548 (0.2206) 0.3726 (0.1756) 0.2434 (0.1740)
Welfare 0.2370 (0.2525) 0.3843 (0.5784) 0.3490 (0.2925) 0.1697 (0.1864)
Job missing 0.1301 (0.1545) 0.1551 (0.2274) 0.1848 (0.1498) 0.1964 (0.1819)
Professional 0.0213 (0.1527) 0.0525 (0.1627) 0.1390 (0.1267) -0.0293 (0.1313)
Other Jobs 0.2417 (0.1244) 0.2234 (0.1327) 0.2748 (0.1197) 0.1722 (0.1122)
Continued on Next Page
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Table – Continued
Num. of students at home 0.0124 (0.0601) 0.0151 (0.0636) 0.0026 (0.0636) -0.0009 (0.0604)
latent (ρt21) -0.0006 (0.0899) - 0.0726 (0.1125) -
latent (ρt22) 0.0514 (0.0825) - 0.0752 (0.1100) -
latent (ρt23) -0.0198 (0.0863) - 0.0265 (0.1063) -
Group Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
σ
2(∗)
c 0.7146 (0.3343) 0.7668 (0.3547) 0.7044 (0.3113) 0.7204 (0.3221)
σ
2(∗)
t 9.6977 (5.2670) 9.9626 (5.4396) 9.7996 (5.7607) 9.1737 (4.6752)
σ
(∗)
tc -0.4980 (0.7091) -0.5104 (0.6754) -0.4986 (0.6626) -0.4618 (0.6111)
Note: The full model contains the activity outcome equation with interactions and the network formation model,
where the network formation model involves the latent characteristic variables and the incentive effect. In the
second column, we remove the latent variables from the network formation model. In the third column, we
remove the incentive effect from the network formation model. In the fourth column, we only estimate the activity
outcome equation. The MCMC runs for 150,000 iterations and the first 50,000 runs are dropped for the burn-in.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations of draws from MCMC. σ
2(∗)
c , σ
2(∗)
t , and σ
(∗)
tc denote the average of
σ2c , σ
2
t
, and σtc estimated from different groups and the value in the parenthesis is the average of standard
deviations.
5 Conclusion
Researchers are interested in network structures in order to analyze its impact on outcomes.
As mentioned in Jackson (2010, section 5), if networks only serve as conduits for diffusion,
e.g., diseases or ideas, their impact on outcomes is sort of mechanical and one need not worry
about any feedback effects from outcomes. However, for studying the impact of a friendship
network on outcomes, both the network structure and strategic interactions between the
network and outcomes should be considered. This extra consideration should be reflected in
a dynamic or static equilibrium model. In this paper, we propose a static equilibrium model
which takes into account these features. The modeling approach in this paper is a com-
plete information game, which assumes that students respond to incentives stemming from
interaction benefits of activity outcomes with friends in making their friendship decisions
in addition to unobserved individual characteristics in network formation and as factors for
activities. The empirical results show that American high school students regard the in-
teraction benefit from academic learning as a significant incentive for forming friendships,
while the incentive effect of smoking together is not, even smoking behavior is important for
the homophily effect. Another novelty of our approach to the social interaction literature is
41
to correct possible friendship selection biases in activity outcomes under interactions, which
can be attributed to the specification of incentive effects, latent characteristic variables, or
both.
Some issues that are not emphasized in this paper remain important for future exten-
sions. The first is an alternative model of simultaneous non-cooperative network formation
game and the problem of multiple game equilibria. We circumvent the latter problem in
the present paper with a cooperative setting by assuming a benevolent social planner who
manages overall network links and activities to maximize an aggregated utility, or individu-
als themselves coordinate their friendship formation processes and interactions for activities.
Those assumptions in friendship formation may be appropriate for a school setting, but are
questionable for some other circumstances. With multiple equilibria in games, one could
either provide an equilibrium selection rule or characterize the estimation problem with mo-
ment inequalities. The second issue to consider is the dynamic evolution of networks and
outcomes. The work of Steglich et al. (2010) provides an important reference in that di-
rection. Last, we are interested in applying our modeling strategies to study the formation
of other types of networks, e.g., criminal network, physician referral network, or academic
co-author network, and economic activities in those networks in future research.
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Appendix
A Tobit-type activity interactions
In certain cases, activity variables might be continuous, but subject to non-negative con-
straints. The observed outcomes may mix with zeros and positive continuous quantities.
This is a Tobit-type variable left-censored at the value zero. To distinguish a Tobit-type
activity variable from a continuous one, we replace yi,cg with yi,tg and impose the constraint,
yi,tg ≥ 0, on the individual utility of Eq. (1). Under this constraint, the sub-game coopera-
tive equilibrium activity vector for a given Wg will be solved from maximization of Eq. (2)
subject to non-negative constraints, which is characterized as:
Ytg = max
(
0, Y¨tg
)
Y¨tg = λt(Wg +W
′
g)Ytg +Xgβ1t +WgXgβ2t + lgαtg + tg, (A.1)
where Y¨tg represents a vector of latent variables. The solution Ytg must satisfy Ytg ≥ λt(Wg+
W ′g)Ytg+Xgβ1t+WgXgβ2t+lgαtg+tg, Ytg ≥ 0, and yi,tg = λt
∑mg
j=1(wij,g+wji,g)yj,tg+xi,gβ1t+∑mg
j=1 wij,gxj,gβ2t+αtg+i,tg whenever yi,tg > 0 for each i, i = 1, · · · ,mg. Under the conditions
as in Amemiya (1974) for a general simultaneous Tobit equation system, the solution Ytg is
unique and can be obtained from a constrained optimization problem
max
yi,tg ,i=1,··· ,n
mg∑
i=1
ui,tg(yi,tg, Y−i,tg,Wg) subject to Ytg ≥ 0. (A.2)
For our case, the unique solution follows from that the aggregated utility function is a strictly
concave function of Ytg on a convex set. Furthermore, with a properly restricted parameter
space on λt, namely, ||λt(Wg + W ′g)||∞ < 1, where ||.||∞ is the maximum row sum norm,
we can show that the solution Ytg can be conveniently obtained via a contraction mapping
algorithm and Ytg is stable. Denote a ∨ 0 = max{a, 0} for a scalar a. Consider a mapping
z : Rmg+ → Rmg+ , where Rmg+ = {Ytg : Ytg ∈ Rmg , Ytg ≥ 0}, defined by
z(Ytg) = (λt(Wg +W ′g)Ytg +Hg) ∨ 0 =

(
λt(w1.,g + w
′
.1,g)Ytg +H1,g
) ∨ 0
...(
λt(wmg .,g + w
′
.mg ,g)Ytg +Hmg ,g
)
∨ 0
 ,
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where Hg = Xgβ1t + WgXgβ2t + lgαtg + tg, wi.,g is the i
th row of Wg, w.i,g is the i
th column
of Wg, and Hi,g is the ith row of Hg. For any Y˜tg and Y˜tg in R
mg
+ ,
‖ z(Y˜tg)−z(Y˜tg) ‖∞
=‖ ((λt(Wg +W ′g)Y˜tg +Hg) ∨ 0)− ((λt(Wg +W ′g)Y˜tg +Hg) ∨ 0) ‖∞
= max
i=1,··· ,mg
∣∣∣∣((λt(wi.,g + w′.i,g)Y˜tg +Hi,g) ∨ 0)− ((λt(wi.,g + w′.i,g)Y˜tg +Hi,g) ∨ 0)∣∣∣∣
≤ max
i=1,··· ,mg
∣∣∣∣λt(wi.,g + w′.i,g)(Y˜tg − Y˜tg)∣∣∣∣ =‖ λt(Wg +W ′g)(Y˜tg − Y˜tg) ‖∞
≤‖ λt(Wg +W ′g) ‖∞ · ‖ Y˜tg − Y˜tg ‖∞ .
Thus, if ‖ λt(Wg + W ′g) ‖∞< 1, z(·) is a contraction mapping. The assumption ||λt(Wg +
W ′g)||∞ < 1 implies the SAR process is stable in the cross section dimension because the
series expansion of the spatial transformation (Img − λt(Wg +W ′g))−1 =
∑∞
l=0 λ
l
t(Wg +W
′
g)
l
exists. As z(·) is a contraction mapping, there exist a unique fixed point Ytg such that
z(Ytg) = Ytg. The observed Ytg is the unique solution of this Tobit equation, because
Ytg = z(Ytg) = (λt(Wg +W ′g)Ytg +Hg) ∨ 0, which gives Ytg ≥ 0, Ytg ≥ λ(Wg +W ′g)Ytg +Hg
and yi,tg = λt(wi.,g + w
′
.i,g)Ytg + Hi,g whenever yi,tg > 0 for any i in the group g. This
contraction mapping feature also suggests a simple iterative algorithm to solve for Ytg given
values of λt, Wg and Hg.
B Likelihood function for a full model with Tobit ac-
tivity outcomes
For the Tobit-type activity variable Ytg, we can divide the mg individuals in group g into
two blocks, such that the first mg1 individuals have activity variables equal to zero and the
remaining individuals who are arranged from mg1 + 1 to mg have positive values. Eq. (A.1)
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of Ytg and the network Wg can be conformably decomposed into Y¨tg1
Ytg2
 =
λt
 W11,g +W ′11,g W12,g +W ′21,g
W21,g +W
′
12,g W22,g +W
′
22,g
 Ytg1
Ytg2
+
 X1g
X2g
 β1t +
 W11,g W12,g
W21,g W22,g
 X1g
X2g
 β2t
+
 Z1g
Z2g
 ρ1t +
 W11,g W12,g
W21,g W22,g
 Z1g
Z2g
 ρ2t +
 lg1
lg2
αtg +
 ξtg1
ξtg2
 , (B.1)
where Ytg2 > 0 and Ytg1 = 0 with the corresponding latent Y¨tg1 ≤ 0. Based on Eq. (B.1), the
joint probability function of Ytg and Wg can be written as
P (Ytg,Wg|θtg, αtg, Zg)
= P (Ytg1 = 0, Ytg2,Wg|θtg, αtg, Zg)
=
∫
I(Ytg1 = 0, Y¨tg1) · P (Y¨tg1, Ytg2,Wg|θtg, αtg, Zg) · dY¨tg1
=
∫ −(λt(W12,g+W ′21,g)Ytg2+X1gβ1t+(W11,gX1g+W12,gX2g)β2t+Z1gρ1t+(W11,gZ1g+W12,gZ2g)ρ2t+lg1αtg)
−∞∣∣Img−mg1 − λt(W22,g +W ′22,g)∣∣ · f(ξtg1, ξtg2|θtg, αtg, Zg) · P (Wg|ξtg1, ξtg2, θtg, αtg, Zg) · dξtg1,
(B.2)
where I(Ytg1 = 0, Y¨tg1) is a dichotomous indicator which is equal to 1 when Y¨tg1 is negative,
and equal to 0, otherwise; ξtg2 =
(
Img−mg1 − λt(W22,g +W ′22,g)
)
Ytg2 −X2gβ1t − (W21,gX1g +
W22,gX2g)β2t − Z2gρ1t − (W21,gZ1g +W22,gZ2g)ρ2t − l2gαtg and θtg = (γ′, η′, δt, λt, β′t, ρ′t, σ2ξtg).
Incentive effects can be from a total of d¯ activity variables which consist of mixed contin-
uous and Tobit-type ones. For simplicity, we consider a model with one continuous and one
Tobit-type activity variable, where the disturbances, ξi,tg and ξi,cg, follow a bivariate normal
distribution,
(ξi,tg, ξi,cg) ∼ i.i.d. N2
 0
0
 ,
 σ2ξtg σξtcg
σξctg σ
2
ξcg
 , i = 1, · · · ,mg. (B.3)
From Eq. (B.3), conditional on ξcg, one has
ξtg = σξtcgσ
−2
ξcg
ξcg + ug, ug ∼ Nmg(0, σ2ugImg), (B.4)
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where ug is independent of ξcg and σ
2
ug = (σ
2
ξtg
− σξtcgσ−2ξcgσξcg).
Let θctg = (γ
′, η′, δc, δt, λc, λt, β′c, β
′
t, ρ
′
c, ρ
′
t, σ
2
ξcg
, σ2ξtg , σξtcg), the joint probability function of
Ytg, Ycg, and Wg is
P (Ytg, Ycg,Wg|θctg, αcg, αtg, Zg)
=
∫ −(λt(W12,g+W ′21,g)Ytg2+X1gβ1t+(W11,gX1g+W12,gX2g)β2t+Z1gρ1t+(W11,gZ1g+W12,gZ2g)ρ2t+lg1αtg)
−∞∣∣Img−mg1 − λt(W22,g +W ′22,g)∣∣ · f (ξtg|ξcg, θctg, αtg, αcg, Zg) · |Scg(Wg)| · f(ξcg|θcg, αcg, Zg)
· P (Wg|ξcg, ξtg, θctg, αtg, αcg, Zg) · dξtg1. (B.5)
C Posterior analysis for a full model with continuous
and Tobit-type activities
Here we discuss the posterior distribution of parameters in the model with one continuous
and one Tobit-type activity variables. By Bayes’ theorem, the joint posterior distribution of
the parameters and latent variables in the model is
P
(
{θctg}, {αcg}, {αtg}, {Zg}, {Y¨tg1}|{Ycg}, {Ytg}, {Wg}
)
∝ pi({θctg}, {αcg}, {αtg}, {Zg})·
G∏
g=1
{(
mg1∏
i=1
I(yi,tg = 0) · I(y¨i,tg ≤ 0)
)
· P
(
Ytg, Ycg,Wg, Y¨tg1|θctg, αcg, αtg, Zg
)}
, (C.1)
where pi(·) represents the prior density function. The prior distributions for parameters and
latent variables in the model are defined as follows:
(i) Unobserved individual latent variables in both network formation model and economic
activity equation,
zi,g ∼ N¯`(0, I¯`), i = 1, · · · ,mg; g = 1, · · · , G.
(ii) Coefficients of network formation model,
φ = (γ′, η′, δc, δt) ∼ N2s¯+q¯+¯`+h¯+2(φ0,Φ0I2s¯+q¯+¯`+h¯+2), φ ∈ O.
(iii) Endogenous interaction parameters in the economic activity equation,
λc ∼ U [−1/τG, 1/τG] and λt ∼ U [−1/τG, 1/τG].
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(iv) Coefficients of own and contextual effects in the economic activity equation,
βc ∼ N2k(β0, B0I2k) and βt ∼ N2k(β0, B0I2k).
(v) Coefficients of own and contextual correlated effects in the economic activity equation,
ρc ∼ N2¯`(ρ0, R0I2¯`) and ρt ∼ N2¯`(ρ0, R0I2¯`).
(vi) Variances and covariance of disturbance in economic activity equation,
σg = (σ
2
ξcg
, σ2ξtg , σξctg) ∼ N3 (σ0,Σ0I3) , σg ∈ Tg, g = 1, · · · , G.
(vii) Group fixed effects in the economic activity equation,
αcg ∼ N (α0, A0) and αtg ∼ N (α0, A0), g = 1, · · · , G.
The above prior distributions are largely inherited from the ones in Section 3.2. The only
difference here is that we put σ2ξcg , σ
2
ξtg
, and σξctg into a group, σg, and specify a multivariate
normal distribution truncated to the area, Tg = {σg ∈ R3|σ2ξcg > 0, σ2ξtg > 0, σ2ξcgσ2ξtg −σ2ξctg ≥
0}, so that σ2ξcg , σ2ξtg , and σξctg form a proper covariance matrix. In the case of correlated
random group effects, we change the prior settings for αcg and αtg in (vii). We specify αcg
and αtg as follows:
αcg = Xgβ3c + Zgρ3c + ζcg, ζcg ∼ N (0, σ2α,c),
αtg = Xgβ3t + Zgρ3t + ζtg, ζtg ∼ N (0, σ2α,t),
where Xg and Zg are, respectively, the group averages of Xg and Zg. β3c, ρ3c, β3t, ρ3t,
σ2α,c, and σ
2
α,t are unknown parameters, and we specify the following prior distributions for
them: β3c ∼ Nk(β0, B0Ik), ρ3c ∼ N¯`(ρ0, R0I¯`), β3t ∼ Nk(β0, B0Ik), ρ3t ∼ N¯`(ρ0, R0I¯`),
σ2α,c ∼ IG (κ02 , ν02 ), and σ2α,t ∼ IG (κ02 , ν02 )
D Simulation experiment for parameter identification
In Bayesian analysis, data are conditionally uninformative for nonidentified parameters given
identified ones (Dre`ze, 1974; Poirier, 1998). Let a K × 1 vector θ = [θ′1, θ2]′ denote unknown
model parameters, where θ1 ((K−1)×1) are identifiable and θ2 (1×1) may not. Proposition
2 of Poirier (1998) states that in that case data are always conditionally (on θ1) uninformative
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for θ2, i.e., f(θ2|θ1, y) = f(θ2|θ1), where f(θ2|θ1) denotes the probability density function of
θ2 given θ1. Applying this proposition to our model, if f(λ|θ1, y) and f(δ|θ1, y) (conditioning
on other identified parameters θ1), are different from f(λ|θ1) and f(δ|θ1), then λ and δ are
identifiable. Furthermore, Bayesian analysis from stationary models (see, e.g., Berger (1985),
p.224) shows that under certain regularity conditions, the Bayesian asymptotic theory re-
lating to the posterior is identical to the asymptotic distribution theory for the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE). One of the regularity conditions is that the parameter is iden-
tified. Therefore, identification will be further assured when the posterior distribution is
concentrated at the MLE in the large sample case where the role of the prior vanishes.
In the simulation, we generate artificial networks from the exponential distribution in
Eq. (10) and also generate continuous and Tobit-type activity variables from the activity
outcome equations in Eqs. (5) and (A.1). Given artificial data y, we simulate draws from the
conditional posterior distributions f(λ|θ1, y) and f(δ|θ1, y) with identifiable parameters (θ1)
fixed at their true values and compare them with draws from f(λ|θ1) and f(δ|θ1), which
would be just f(λ) and f(δ) by assuming independence among priors. We implement the
simulation with different sample sizes and inspect whether the conditional posterior plots of
λ and δ will become more concentrated at their true parameter values when there is more
information from sample.
In the data generating process (DGP), the network size is fixed at 30 and the number
of groups varies from 20, 60, to 100. In order to enhance the notion that identification of λ
and δ is valid generally for different DGPs, we examine the results based on two different
sets of DGP parameters. In the network interaction models (for both continuous and Tobit-
type variables), the exogenous variable Xi is generated from N(0, 36). The group effect
α is generated from N(0, 0.5). The disturbance term i is generated from N(0, 0.5). For
simplicity, there are no unobserved latent variable Z, and the contextual variable WX is not
included.
In the network formation model, exogenous effects for each link wij are captured by a
constant term and a dyad-specific exogenous variable Cij which is generated as follows: first
draw two uniform random variables from U(0, 1), which are denoted as U1 and U2. If U1 and
U2 are both larger than 0.7 or less than 0.3, then we set Cij to one. Otherwise, we set it to
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zero. The parameters for exogenous and network structure effects are set as: γ31 = −3.2;
γ32 = 0.4; η1 = 0.4; η2 = 0.2; η3 = −0.03; η4 = 0.03; η5 = 0.3; η6 = −0.2. We consider
two sets of parameters for the endogenous effect in activities and the incentive effect in
network formation. In the first set (DGP-I), (λc, λt, δc, δt) equals (0.05, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3). In the
second set (DGP-II), (λc, λt, δc, δt) equals (0.02, 0.02, 0.6, 0.6). These parameters are chosen
to control the average number of friends at around 2 in a group of 30 people. Each artificial
network W is simulated by the M-H algorithm from an empty network based on P (W |θ) in
Eq. (10). The following step is implemented iteratively (Snijders, 2002): For each entry of
Wg, wij,g, i 6= j, in turn, we propose w˜ij,g = 1− wij,g. With the acceptance probability
α(w˜ij, wij) = min
{
P (w˜ij,W−ij|θ)
P (wij,W−ij|θ) , 1
}
= min
{
exp (V(w˜ij,W−ij, θ))
exp (V(wij,W−ij, θ))
, 1
}
,
updating wij to w˜ij. Note that the denominators of P (w˜ij,W−ij|θ) and P (wij,W−ij|θ) are
cancelled out because the two probabilities are evaluated at the same θ. Activity variables
are simulated along with networks. The M-H algorithm runs through the whole network for
a total of 10,000 iterations and realizations of the network and the activity variables from
the last iteration are used as the data.
The total of 100,000 draws are simulated for λ and δ from the conditional posterior dis-
tributions (given other parameters fixed at the true values) using the double M-H algorithm
discussed in Section 3.3. Figures A.1 and A.2 show the results of continuous and Tobit
cases based on, respectively, the DGP-I and the DGP-II. In each figure, panel (a) gives the
continuous case and panel (b) gives the Tobit case. The true values of the parameters are
marked in the horizontal axis. One can see that the conditional posterior distributions are
clearly different from the prior distributions. When the sample size increases, the posterior
distributions of both λ and δ become sharply concentrated around the true values. The
findings provide the evidence that the two key parameters in our model are identified from
the Bayesian point of view.
Finally, we use this simulation environment to illustrate the computational cost of our
estimation algorithm. We take the data generating process for the continuous activity case
from the DGP-I aforementioned and consider the different network sizes at (20,40,60,80,100).
The number of networks is less of a concern for computation because we can use parallel
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computation to speed up. So we fix the number of networks at 20. We estimate the true
model using the DMH algorithm and record the average CPU time for each MCMC iteration
based on a machine with dual Xeon 2.60 GHz CPUs. The plot of computational time is in
Figure A.3. We can see that the time increases exponentially with the network size.
E Bayesian data imputation for missing dependent vari-
ables
The advantage of data implementation this is that we do not need to drop individuals with
missing variables and could retrieve information provided by these missing observations. This
can be important for observations of agents in a game if some agents play important roles in
the game, e.g., star players. It is intuitive if stars were dropped, we might not be able to and
obtain consistent and efficient estimates. The imputation of a missing independent variable
can be much difficult if there are no specific stochastic processes assumed for their generation.
However, missing dependent variables can be easily handled based on the specified stochastic
processes. Let Ymis and Yobs denote, respectively, the missing and observed parts of Y . The
Bayesian approach for missing data is implemented by the following two steps at every
(t + 1)th MCMC sampling iteration: Imputation (I) step: Y
(t+1)
mis ∼ P (Ymis|Yobs,W, θ(t)) and
Posterior (P) step: θ(t+1) ∼ P (θ|Yobs, Y (t+1)mis ,W ). For the I step, since P (Ymis|Yobs,W, θ) =
P (Ymis,Yobs,W |θ)
P (Yobs,W |θ) , it can be implemented by the double M-H algorithm in Section 3.3. Given
Ymis from the I step, the P step will follow the procedures described in Section 3.2.
F Appendix Tables and Figures
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Figure A.1: Simulation results based on DGP-I
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Figure A.2: Simulation results based on DGP-II
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Figure A.3: The average computation time in seconds for a single MCMC iteration
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Table A1: Estimation result with correlated random group effects
Full Without Latent Without Incentive Activity Alone
Network Formation
Higher sender age (γ1) 0.0048 (0.0614) -0.0020 (0.0478) -0.0271 (0.0378) -
Higher receiver age (γ2) 0.0365 (0.0455) 0.0929 (0.0408) 0.0199 (0.0401) -
Constant (γ31) -3.2546 (0.0772) -4.7160 (0.0389) -3.3591 (0.2192) -
Same age (γ32) 0.1791 (0.0444) 0.1612 (0.0431) 0.2044 (0.0440) -
Same sex (γ33) 0.3394 (0.0291) 0.3692 (0.0474) 0.3780 (0.0392) -
Same race (γ34) 0.6582 (0.0401) 0.6320 (0.0467) 0.6635 (0.0503) -
Diff. in smoking (γ35) -0.0486 (0.0093) -0.0325 (0.0079) -0.0416 (0.0092) -
Latent dist. (γ41) -0.3834 (0.0549) - -0.4490 (0.0655) -
Latent dist. (γ42) -0.3142 (0.0383) - -0.3439 (0.0610) -
Latent dist. (γ43) -0.3190 (0.0750) - -0.2511 (0.0980) -
Reciprocality (η1) 1.2330 (0.0488) 1.3725 (0.0246) 1.2192 (0.0507) -
Expansiveness (η2) 0.1868 (0.0180) 0.2594 (0.0172) 0.2068 (0.0262) -
Expansiveness (η3) -0.0225 (0.0019) -0.0286 (0.0019) -0.0244 (0.0026) -
Popularity (η4) -0.0512 (0.0075) -0.0336 (0.0048) -0.0417 (0.0072) -
Trans. triads (η5) 0.5910 (0.0255) 0.5647 (0.0124) 0.5844 (0.0198) -
Three cycles (η6) -0.2360 (0.0229) -0.2347 (0.0125) -0.2251 (0.0177) -
Incentive from GPA (δc) 0.0022 (0.0014) 0.0021 (0.0013) - -
Incentive from Smoking (δt) 0.9020 (0.1620) 0.6092 (0.1436) - -
Activity Outcome
Endogenous (λc) 0.0106 (0.0027) 0.0108 (0.0041) 0.0142 (0.0032) 0.0162 (0.0034)
Endogenous (λt) 0.0467 (0.0100) 0.0545 (0.0123) 0.0449 (0.0107) 0.0570 (0.0115)
GPA
Own (X)
Age -0.1932 (0.0193) -0.1899 (0.0338) -0.1940 (0.0403) -0.2174 (0.0205)
Male -0.1356 (0.0314) -0.0728 (0.0489) -0.1142 (0.0338) -0.0758 (0.0434)
Black 0.0187 (0.0477) 0.0324 (0.0704) 0.0205 (0.0494) 0.0312 (0.0737)
Asian 0.0669 (0.0497) 0.4337 (0.1725) 0.1255 (0.0651) 0.3062 (0.2026)
Hispanic 0.0993 (0.0507) 0.1127 (0.1096) 0.1655 (0.0709) 0.1413 (0.0883)
Other race -0.0835 (0.0390) 0.0190 (0.0669) -0.0026 (0.0576) -0.0084 (0.1105)
Both Parents 0.0454 (0.0341) 0.0603 (0.0495) 0.0474 (0.0403) 0.0270 (0.0519)
Less HS -0.0991 (0.0447) -0.0740 (0.0805) -0.1434 (0.0518) -0.0971 (0.0722)
More HS 0.1550 (0.0439) 0.1440 (0.0487) 0.1137 (0.0451) 0.1339 (0.0503)
Edu missing -0.1225 (0.0343) -0.0947 (0.0949) -0.0766 (0.0694) -0.0828 (0.0794)
Welfare -0.1185 (0.0437) 0.0579 (0.1171) 0.0574 (0.0640) 0.0461 (0.1808)
Job missing -0.1435 (0.0351) -0.1207 (0.0798) -0.0333 (0.0498) -0.1101 (0.0803)
Professional 0.0239 (0.0423) 0.0582 (0.0651) 0.0698 (0.0486) 0.0206 (0.0647)
Other Jobs -0.0312 (0.0229) -0.0015 (0.0600) -0.0066 (0.0348) -0.0406 (0.0562)
Num. of students at home 0.0002 (0.0216) -0.0147 (0.0312) -0.0111 (0.0269) -0.0078 (0.0284)
latent (ρc11) -0.0048 (0.0360) - 0.2430 (0.0693) -
latent (ρc12) -0.0434 (0.0292) - -0.0028 (0.0469) -
latent (ρc13) 0.0045 (0.0347) - 0.0226 (0.0604) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0031 (0.0016) -0.0018 (0.0019) -0.0014 (0.0027) -0.0027 (0.0029)
Male -0.0271 (0.0138) -0.0308 (0.0168) -0.0095 (0.0303) -0.0168 (0.0307)
Black -0.0354 (0.0151) -0.0338 (0.0190) -0.0495 (0.0208) -0.0363 (0.0243)
Asian 0.0267 (0.0537) -0.1162 (0.1229) 0.1507 (0.0522) 0.1958 (0.2200)
Continued on Next Page
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Table – Continued
Hispanic 0.0180 (0.0297) 0.0528 (0.0360) 0.0371 (0.0466) -0.0104 (0.0704)
Other race 0.0004 (0.0360) 0.0583 (0.0441) -0.0833 (0.0539) -0.0805 (0.0666)
Both Parents 0.0588 (0.0165) 0.0583 (0.0203) 0.0106 (0.0340) 0.0251 (0.0368)
Less HS -0.0496 (0.0169) -0.0446 (0.0265) -0.0630 (0.0386) -0.0432 (0.0475)
More HS -0.0173 (0.0161) -0.0261 (0.0202) 0.0312 (0.0326) 0.0295 (0.0318)
Edu missing -0.0575 (0.0276) -0.0713 (0.0379) 0.0064 (0.0628) 0.0211 (0.0607)
Welfare -0.0528 (0.0393) 0.0090 (0.0855) -0.1344 (0.0510) -0.1594 (0.1751)
Job missing -0.0508 (0.0211) -0.0537 (0.0348) -0.0065 (0.0450) -0.0131 (0.0578)
Professional -0.0002 (0.0199) 0.0078 (0.0271) 0.0174 (0.0329) 0.0099 (0.0444)
Other Jobs -0.0122 (0.0171) -0.0066 (0.0228) -0.0057 (0.0307) -0.0001 (0.0354)
Num. of students at home 0.0061 (0.0098) 0.0012 (0.0114) 0.0025 (0.0181) 0.0031 (0.0196)
latent (ρc21) -0.0269 (0.0213) - -0.0364 (0.0306) -
latent (ρc22) 0.0547 (0.0243) - 0.0158 (0.0256) -
latent (ρc23) -0.0452 (0.0239) - -0.0144 (0.0359) -
Correlated Random Effect (X)
Age 0.3257 (0.6458) 0.3111 (0.6116) 0.3214 (0.6486) 0.3382 (0.6434)
Male 0.1967 (9.6754) 0.4265 (9.0640) 0.1688 (9.6482) 0.3577 (9.4387)
Black -0.0922 (4.9512) -0.1236 (4.6723) -0.1716 (4.9416) -0.1436 (4.9194)
Asian 0.3193 (18.7235) 0.3134 (18.4243) 0.7362 (18.6750) 0.5420 (18.6344)
Hispanic 0.1056 (9.7168) -0.1482 (9.3593) 0.2323 (9.7102) 0.0720 (9.6599)
Other race -0.0274 (14.5305) 0.1654 (13.9461) -0.3759 (14.2762) 0.2466 (14.2024)
Both Parents 0.5370 (10.8596) 0.4546 (10.5223) 0.4652 (10.8335) 0.5256 (10.9213)
Less HS 0.1247 (12.8917) 0.1546 (12.4712) 0.1432 (12.8580) 0.0003 (12.8120)
More HS 0.4390 (8.7619) 0.1840 (8.3857) 0.2549 (8.7778) 0.1366 (8.6497)
Edu missing 0.1843 (15.6363) 0.2516 (14.9003) 0.3408 (15.4428) 0.1761 (15.2419)
Welfare -0.0125 (18.3675) -0.1758 (18.3475) -0.1359 (18.4517) 0.2984 (18.3747)
Job missing 0.0691 (13.8986) 0.1937 (13.2609) 0.0224 (13.6692) 0.1137 (13.7176)
Professional 0.1912 (12.7137) 0.5938 (12.2890) 0.2481 (12.6612) 0.4122 (12.6191)
Other Jobs -0.0949 (9.4387) -0.0296 (8.8763) 0.0883 (9.3578) 0.0795 (9.2946)
Num. of students at home 0.0552 (5.5880) 0.0541 (5.2834) 0.1521 (5.5671) 0.0745 (5.4621)
latent (ρt11) 0.0635 (5.5163) - -0.1827 (5.6083) -
latent (ρt12) 0.0338 (5.5291) - -0.0490 (5.5158) -
latent (ρt13) 0.0281 (5.4614) - -0.0379 (5.5604) -
Smoking
Own (X)
Age 0.4221 (0.0860) 0.3807 (0.0798) 0.5352 (0.0530) 0.4164 (0.0828)
Male 0.2383 (0.1308) 0.1508 (0.1517) 0.1303 (0.1247) 0.1299 (0.1254)
Black -1.9280 (0.2679) -1.6525 (0.2469) -1.7920 (0.2543) -1.6762 (0.2481)
Asian -1.9015 (0.3318) -2.0060 (0.4363) -1.4356 (0.3264) -1.8215 (0.2691)
Hispanic -0.0401 (0.1506) -0.7522 (0.3475) -0.1200 (0.2954) -0.8075 (0.3219)
Other race 0.4624 (0.2102) 0.1610 (0.2734) 0.2263 (0.2060) 0.1639 (0.3249)
Both Parents -0.0773 (0.2025) 0.0963 (0.1648) 0.0911 (0.1784) 0.0777 (0.1615)
Less HS -0.0970 (0.1915) 0.0281 (0.2397) -0.0824 (0.1371) -0.0105 (0.1875)
More HS -0.1787 (0.1483) -0.1338 (0.1701) -0.0028 (0.1194) -0.1037 (0.1476)
Edu missing -0.3274 (0.2467) -0.0058 (0.2638) 0.0503 (0.1632) -0.0059 (0.1812)
Welfare 1.2654 (0.3151) 1.2816 (0.5558) 1.6113 (0.1931) 0.9937 (0.3211)
Job missing 0.2229 (0.1459) 0.2886 (0.2370) 0.3021 (0.1588) 0.1286 (0.2084)
Professional -0.1035 (0.1522) 0.1265 (0.2052) 0.1295 (0.1571) 0.1629 (0.1814)
Other Jobs -0.0727 (0.0889) 0.0995 (0.1787) 0.0845 (0.1460) 0.0827 (0.1668)
Continued on Next Page
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Num. of students at home -0.0082 (0.1064) -0.1450 (0.1053) -0.1087 (0.0934) -0.1324 (0.0897)
latent (ρt11) -0.0603 (0.1505) - -0.0045 (0.1129) -
latent (ρt12) 0.1276 (0.1265) - -0.1500 (0.1326) -
latent (ρt13) 0.0973 (0.1301) - 0.1133 (0.1598) -
Contextual (WX)
Age -0.0158 (0.0078) -0.0250 (0.0089) -0.0199 (0.0087) -0.0240 (0.0082)
Male -0.1266 (0.1240) -0.0428 (0.1072) -0.0418 (0.0964) -0.0116 (0.0938)
Black 0.1686 (0.0778) 0.1745 (0.0839) 0.2081 (0.0730) 0.1857 (0.0772)
Asian -1.1693 (0.5327) -1.4833 (0.6703) -1.8210 (0.2862) -0.3909 (0.4563)
Hispanic 0.1043 (0.2275) 0.1525 (0.1769) 0.1823 (0.1498) 0.0967 (0.1749)
Other race -0.0381 (0.1580) 0.1338 (0.2676) 0.2542 (0.1989) 0.0244 (0.2096)
Both Parents -0.0578 (0.1225) -0.0883 (0.1194) -0.0246 (0.1178) -0.0797 (0.1124)
Less HS -0.0574 (0.1323) -0.0529 (0.1778) -0.1050 (0.1363) 0.0148 (0.1449)
More HS 0.2210 (0.1252) 0.0431 (0.1270) 0.0791 (0.1048) 0.0321 (0.1054)
Edu missing 0.5387 (0.1479) 0.3788 (0.2402) 0.3156 (0.2545) 0.2278 (0.2021)
Welfare -0.0076 (0.2431) 0.6396 (0.4986) 0.1081 (0.1513) 0.5351 (0.3508)
Job missing 0.0141 (0.1541) 0.2258 (0.2094) 0.0124 (0.1642) 0.2133 (0.1709)
Professional -0.1489 (0.1417) 0.1163 (0.1626) -0.0870 (0.1368) 0.0680 (0.1317)
Other Jobs 0.0330 (0.1308) 0.3102 (0.1317) 0.0916 (0.1309) 0.2113 (0.1142)
Num. of students at home 0.0362 (0.0584) -0.0085 (0.0696) 0.0045 (0.0576) -0.0131 (0.0593)
latent (ρt21) 0.0462 (0.0802) - -0.0086 (0.0866) -
latent (ρt22) 0.0375 (0.0731) - 0.0382 (0.0921) -
latent (ρt23) 0.0171 (0.0717) - 0.0691 (0.1028) -
Correlated Random Effect (X)
Age -0.1652 (0.6071) -0.1080 (0.5373) -0.3250 (0.7489) -0.1603 (0.5695)
Male -1.9332 (8.8872) -2.0111 (7.8687) -1.4017 (10.9842) -2.1007 (8.4227)
Black 0.6760 (4.6041) 0.2763 (4.0341) 0.4143 (5.6302) 0.2532 (4.2966)
Asian 0.2341 (18.2343) 0.4194 (17.8418) -0.0043 (19.3088) 0.2590 (18.0800)
Hispanic -0.9169 (9.1570) -0.5190 (8.2714) -1.3354 (10.7728) -0.3832 (8.8383)
Other race -0.5382 (13.6187) -0.4558 (12.3635) -0.5057 (15.4460) -0.5624 (13.0836)
Both Parents 0.3329 (10.2479) 0.1654 (9.1941) 0.1205 (12.1814) 0.1857 (9.7085)
Less HS -0.9616 (12.0032) -1.5175 (11.0930) -0.3752 (14.0601) -1.0755 (11.6925)
More HS -1.0461 (7.9894) -0.6889 (7.1412) -1.0351 (9.7780) -0.4123 (7.5507)
Edu missing -0.7423 (14.6718) -0.7777 (13.3904) -0.4994 (16.6094) -0.4121 (14.1074)
Welfare 0.3628 (17.8178) 0.0864 (17.2431) 0.0106 (18.9248) 0.5849 (17.6998)
Job missing -0.9863 (12.8182) -1.7372 (11.6045) -0.9351 (15.1333) -1.5522 (12.2518)
Professional -2.1732 (11.8763) -2.9265 (10.7475) -1.5813 (13.7070) -2.8710 (11.4338)
Other Jobs -0.3667 (8.8045) -0.9255 (7.7338) -0.2556 (10.5796) -0.7250 (8.2415)
Num. of students at home -0.8708 (5.1811) -0.3703 (4.4959) -0.4571 (6.5132) -0.2821 (4.8715)
latent (ρt11) -0.0339 (5.0441) - 0.1076 (6.6847) -
latent (ρt12) -0.2307 (5.0791) - 0.0487 (6.6196) -
latent (ρt13) -0.1692 (5.0234) - -0.3445 (6.7278) -
σ2α,c 34.8945 (9.2216) 33.2820 (9.9289) 34.3369 (11.5099) 38.5704 (10.1055)
σ2α,t 28.2333 (15.0682) 27.2746 (12.3443) 27.7732 (17.4457) 27.5373 (16.5197)
σ
2(∗)
c 0.7145 (0.3142) 0.7689 (0.3501) 0.6686 (0.3238) 0.7619 (0.3564)
σ
2(∗)
t 10.3129 (5.9717) 9.8392 (5.3859) 9.9881 (5.6195) 9.8911 (5.4676)
σ
(∗)
tc -0.5313 (0.6983) -0.5246 (0.7401) -0.5102 (0.7255) -0.5107 (0.6744)
Continued on Next Page
65
Table – Continued
Note: The full model contains the activity outcome equation with interactions and the network formation model,
where the network formation model involves the latent characteristic variables and the incentive effect. In the
second column, we remove the latent variables from the network formation model. In the third column, we
remove the incentive effect from the network formation model. In the fourth column, we only estimate the activity
outcome equation. The MCMC runs for 150,000 iterations and the first 50,000 runs are dropped for the burn-in.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations of draws from MCMC. σ
2(∗)
c , σ
2(∗)
t , and σ
(∗)
tc denote the average of
σ2c , σ
2
t
, and σtc estimated from different groups and the value in the parenthesis is the average of standard
deviations.
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